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Executive Summary 
The integrity of the European Union Emission Trading Scheme (EU ETS) relies upon 
consistent and uniform implementation and enforcement across all 31 participating states. 
The compliance cycle of the ETS - consisting of compliance assistance, inspection and 
enforcement - is a continuous dynamic, complex process. Although harmonisation of 
monitoring, verification and reporting (MRV) has improved, the functioning of the ETS 
compliance practice in the different Member States varies greatly. This is due to differences 
in underlying principles of enforcement strategies, institutional settings and in funding. While 
compliance rates are currently high, efforts should be afforded to ensuring more harmonized 
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1 Introduction 
In this deliverable, we report on an ex-post evaluation of the legal implementation of The 
European Union Emissions Trading Scheme (EU ETS) at Member State level. The EU ETS 
legislation originally left a considerable amount of discretion to Member States. Earlier 
reports have indicated that the decentralised approach pursued in the Directive has 
adversely affected the effectiveness of the system. Subsequent amendments to EU ETS 
legislation has gradually reduced the level of decentralization. The latest changes made to 
the ETS, the ones that apply to the current trading phase (2013-2020), have greatly 
centralized the ETS. Particularly regarding enforcement issues various elements of the ETS 
however remain within the domain of the Member States. The effectiveness and reliability of 
the ETS, therefore, partly depends on the effort of each of the 31 participating States.1 A lack 
of compliance in one or a few Member States may harm the functioning of the ETS in the 
entire EU. 
This issue becomes even more pressing when third states are joining the EU ETS. The EU’s 
policy is aimed at a gradual expansion of the ETS, with the final aim of transforming the ETS 
into a global system.2 It is expected that harmonization of the compliance mechanism will 
form a central element of the legal arrangements aimed at the integration of ‘foreign’ ETSs 
into the EU ETS. 
In line with the outcome of discussions during the kick-off meeting of consortium at the ZEW 
in Mannheim (24-25 September 2012), we focussed our research mainly on the 
implementation of the provisions aimed at enhancing compliance (monitoring, verification 
and enforcement), however, without losing sight of the broader functioning of the ETS. In 





                                               
1
 Participating States are the 28 Member States of the EU and Norway, Iceland and Liechtenstein.  
2
 See D. Ellerman, ‘The EU’s Emissions Trading Scheme: A Prototype Global System?’ (2009) Joint 


















308481_ENTRACTE_D2.4_Report of the Legal Implementation of the EU ETS at Member State Level 12 
2 Summary of Work Performed 
As indicated above, many amendments were made to the ETS after the first two phases. Our 
evaluation therefore is mainly aimed at the first experiences in the current, third, phase. The 
research question for this report, therefore, was: 
 
Has the effectiveness of the compliance mechanism of the EU ETS improved in the third 
phase (2013-2020)? What further improvements (if any) are necessary? 
 
To answer this central research question, we set the following steps. First, in Paragraph 3.1, 
we will generally describe the theory of the compliance cycle of the EU ETS. Then, in 
Paragraph 3.2, we will in more detail review the various changes that were made in the 
various EU legal instruments that build the EU ETS, with a special focus on reporting, 
verification, monitoring and compliance. How has the EU legislature tried to improve the 
compliance mechanism? The methodology of these first two steps is the desk study method: 
we researched existing sources (academic literature, research reports and other type of 
evaluations, relevant case law of national and EU courts). The next five paragraphs (par. 4-8) 
hold the case study reports for the selected EU Member States (Germany, Netherlands,  
Poland, Greece, the UK and Hungary). These chapters present an analysis of the 
implementation of the obligations set out in the Directive in these Member States. Here, we 
turn to the question of how the compliance mechanisms have played out in the context of the 
EU ETS at domestic level, drawing on experiences in different Member States. In this part it 
is particularly important to examine whether recent amendments regarding the compliance 
chain are likely to improve the effectiveness of the system. National legislation has been 
examined and compared and the organizational and administrative structures have been 
analysed, including oversight instruments. Public data was gathered both by means of desk 
study and on the basis of interviews with persons from various institutions involved in the 
compliance mechanism.3 The selection of Member States was done in cooperation with the 
other research institutes involved in ENTRACTE (finalized in the Dublin meeting in 2013) and 
represents a mix of new and old Member States, large and smaller countries, as well as a 











                                               
3
 All the interviews are available on transcript with the authors. We would like to thank all persons that 
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3 Results and Conclusion 
3.1 Complying with the EU ETS: Theory and Existing Knowledge  
The EU ETS is the largest trading program in the world designed to combat global climate 
change.4 The theory behind emissions trading is that a market mechanism is established in 
order to mitigate greenhouse gasses. After a cap is set and potential polluting firms have 
obtained allowances to emit, they can either (1) reduce their emissions and sell their 
allowances by for example investing in technological innovation; (2) use their allowances in 
order to cover their emissions; or, (3) increase their emissions by buying additional 
allowances on the market.5 However, the effectiveness of the system – scrutinized since its 
inception in 2005 by both economists and lawyers - thus far is disappointing.  
The crucial importance of a well-developed and operationalized compliance chain has been 
neglected in the original design. In fact, a striking paradox of the EU ETS is that while the 
idea is that the market should be the place to regulate CO2 emissions, the system only 
functions if it operates in a well regulated context. Market participants must have the 
confidence that the system is transparent and consistent, and that it guarantees a level 
playing field for all actors in the 31 participating States. In this regard, information on 
emission allowances, on the amount of allowances that are surrendered, and information on 
actual emissions is essential. Monitoring, reporting and verification of this process are 
therefore of vital importance for effective enforcement. Compliance in this sense means 
monitoring the operation of covered installations to ensure that they operate in accordance 
with the requirements of the EU ETS in order to determine whether further inspection or 
enforcement is necessary to ensure compliance.6 
As stated above, this report examines the legal implementation of monitoring, verification and 
compliance obligations of the EU ETS within different selected Member States. By learning 
lessons from how compliance has been effectuated in a system consisting of multiple 
jurisdictions, we are able to identify the key legal issues that will rise when the EU ETS is 
linked to other greenhouse gas trading systems.   
The EU ETS legislation originally left a considerable amount of discretion to Member States. 
This particularly included operational elements of emission trading, such as registration, 
monitoring, verification, reporting and enforcement issues. Only after European law 
enforcement agencies signaled that in some European countries carbon trading fraudsters 
may have accounted for up to 90% of all market activity, with criminals pocketing billions, the 
compliance issue received increased attention. Moreover, different strategies for ensuring 
compliance among Member States give rise to distortions of the market for greenhouse gas 
allowances. The effectiveness and reliability of the ETS, therefore, to a significant extent 
depends on the effort of each of the Member States. Lack of compliance of only a few or 
even a single Member State can harm the functioning of the ETS in the entire EU. This issue 
becomes even more pressing when third states are joining the EU ETS. This is foreseen, as 
                                               
4
 Established by Directive 2003/87/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 13 October 
2003 establishing a scheme for greenhouse gas emission allowance trading within the Community 
and amending Council Directive 96/61/EC, [2003] OJ L 275/32. 
5 M. Peeters, ‘Inspection and market-based regulation through emission trading: the striking reliance 
on self-monitoring, self-reporting and verification’ Utrecht Law Review (2006) 2(1), 177-195. 
5
 Ibid., 171-172. 
6
 IMPEL Report, Options and Proposals for Consistency in the Implementation of the EU Emissions 
Trading Scheme Report 4: Good Practice in Compliance and Enforcement, May 2007. Available on 
the Internet at: http://impel.eu/wp-content/uploads/2012/09/IMPEL-Report-4-Compliance-and-
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the EU’s policy is aimed at a gradual expansion of the ETS, with the final aim of transforming 
the ETS into a global system. Australia has expressed interest in linking to the EU ETS in the 
past, and most EFTA countries were linked earlier. From a theoretical perspective, linking 
emission-trading systems will increase efficiency of the system by exploiting marginal 
abatement costs of firms in the enlarged system.7 In practice, the success of the system will 
depend on how implementation challenges are tackled, in particular concerning monitoring, 
verification and enforcement. The Commission already emphasised the importance of 
oversight and enforcement in its Green Paper on emission trading in the year 2000, by 
stating that: 
 
‘The purpose of strict compliance provisions and enforcement is to enhance confidence in the trading 
system, make it work in an efficient way in accordance with the rules of the internal market and at the 




In reality, not much attention has been dedicated to this important aspect.9 Gradually, 
however, a series of amendments of the scheme’s operational aspects have been adopted.  
 
3.1.1 Key legal obligations of participating operators in the EU ETS 
 
a. The Greenhouse Gas Emissions permit 
The essence of the EU ETS is that every installation falling within the scope of the system 
surrenders an amount of emission rights that is equal to the amount of emissions emitted 
during a year. This entails obligations for the operators covered, who need to be identified 
here first.  
Since CO2 may no longer be emitted by operators without a GHG emissions permit, this 
permit can be qualified as the core legal instrument in the Directive 2003/87 (hereafter: ‘The 
Directive). The competent authority can only issue a permit if it is satisfied that the operator is 
capable of monitoring and reporting emissions.10 In the permit, the specific activities of the 
installation(s) are described, as well as the main conditions for operating within the EU ETS. 
The permit must include the core obligation for the operator to surrender allowances equal to 
the total emissions of the installation in each calendar year, within 4 months following the end 
of that year.11 In addition, the operator is required to inform the competent authority of any 
changes planned in the nature or functioning, or an extension, of the installation that might 
require updating of the emission permit.12 Of paramount importance is the monitoring plan, 
without which the permit cannot be granted.13 The EU provides for an extensive harmonized 
regulatory framework for the monitoring, reporting and the verification (MRV) to be 
implemented by the Member States to be discussed briefly next. 
 
 b. Monitoring, Reporting and Verification (MRV) 
                                               
7
 Grull, G. and L. Taschini, ‘Linking emissions trading schemes: a short note’ (2010). 
http://personal.lse.ac.uk/TASCHINL/Luca_Taschini_files/Taschini_Linking_ETSs.pdf 
8
 European Commission, Green Paper on greenhouse gas emissions trading, 8 March 2000, 
COM/2000/87, p. 24. 
9
 M. Peeters was an early signaller of this important issue. See M. Peeters, ‘Inspection and market-
based regulation through emission trading: the striking reliance on self-monitoring, self-reporting and 
verification’ Utrecht Law Review (2006) 2(1), 177-195. 
10
 Directive 2003/87, art. 4. 
11
 Directive 2003/87, art. 6(2)(e).  
12
 Directive 2003/87, art. 7. 
13
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The Directive requires that the GHG emissions permit contain a monitoring plan, specifying 
detailed, complete and transparent documentation, including a risk assessment.14 Hence, 
emissions have to be monitored in accordance with the rules of the Commission Regulation 
601/2012/EU on the monitoring and reporting of greenhouse gas emissions, and competent 
authorities must ensure that each operator of an installation reports the emissions from that 
installation during each calendar year after the end of that year.15 An update of the 
monitoring plan does not necessarily has to labeled as ‘a change’ that would require an 
update of the GHG emissions permit.16 
Monitoring provisions require the use of certain monitoring methodologies and detailed 
specific sector rules. Operator must take account of different aspects, such as the location of 
the measurement equipment, calibration and measurement, quality assurance and control, 
missing data and uncertainties.17 The principle of constant improvement of performance in 
monitoring and reporting emissions should encourage in continuously finding new improved 
approaches, herby supported by the verifier. 
In addition to the monitoring requirements, according to Article 6(2)(d) of the Directive the 
operator must draft and submit an emission report.18 Ultimately, Member States have to 
confirm that each operator of an installation reports the emissions from that installation 
during each calendar year to the competent authority after the end of that year. The emission 
reports have to be verified by an independent and certified verifier.19 The verifier has to carry 
out the verification with the aim of providing a verification report that concludes with 
‘reasonable assurance’ that the operator’s or aircraft operator’s report is free from material 
misstatements.’20 This should guarantee the quality and reliability of the self-monitoring and 
self-reporting system that relates to very complex and technical matters. The verifier who is 
commissioned by the operator must carry out its activities with ‘an attitude of professional 
skepticism recognizing that circumstances may exist that cause the information in the 
operator’s or aircraft operator’s report to contain material misstatements’.21 Importantly, since 
2012 there is an obligation for the verifier to include irregularities in the competent authority 
even if the monitoring plan concerned approves the verification report. There are detailed 
rules regarding how verification should be conducted. For example, detailed testing of the 
data, including tracing the data back to the primary data source, cross-checking data with 
external data sources should be performed. During the verification process the verifier must 
also conduct a site visit in order to assess the operation of measuring devices and monitoring 
systems and to conduct interviews.22 Although it is very important that the verification tasks 
are carried out ‘in the public interest’, Member State authorities remain ultimately responsible 
in checking whether compliance exists. 
 
c. Register 
                                               
14
 Ibid., art. 6(2)(c), art. 12.  
15
 Commission Regulation 601/2012/EU of 21 June 2012 on the monitoring and reporting of 
greenhouse gas emissions pursuant to Directive 2003/87/EC of the European Parliament and of the 
Council, [2012] OJ L 181/30. See below for more details on this Regulation. 
16
 Directive 2003/87, art. 6(2)(c) .  
17
 Commission Regulation (EU) No. 601/2012 of 21 June 2012 on the monitoring and reporting of 
greenhouse gas emissions pursuant to Directive 2003/87/EC of the European Parliament and the 
Council, Section 3 and art. 57. There are specific provisions for the aviation sector.  
18
 See also Directive 2009/29, art. 14 and 15, as well as Commission Regulation 600/2012/EU of 21 
June 2012 on the verification of greenhouse gas emission reports and tonne-kilometre reports and the 
accreditation of verifiers pursuant to Directive 2003/87/EC of the European Parliament and of the 
Council, [2012] OJ L 181/1.  
19
 Directive 2003/87, art 15 and Regulation 600/2012/EU of 21 June 2012 on the verification.   
20
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All transactions must be electronically submitted in a Register in order to ensure accurate 
data on transfers and submission or cancellation of emissions. In that way, transaction logs 
are crucial for the functioning of a trading system such as the ETS. If the integrity of the 
Register is harmed this can lead to substantial fraud and cybercrime, including the double 
counting of surrendered allowances or identity theft.23 To secure this integrity, a EU-wide 
registry (European Union Transaction Log) has replaced the national registries during the 
third phase (2013-2020) of the EU ETS.24 
 
3.1.2 The Compliance Cycle of the EU ETS 
The rules on compliance and enforcement have now been for the most been part 
harmonized. Nevertheless, Member States have an indispensable role to play in ensuring the 
effectiveness of the ETS. The active role of Member States in setting up compliance 
strategies is also important for ensuring that competition of the industry covered is not 
seriously distorted, and that there remains a ‘level playing field’.25 Therefore an examination 
of how Member States perform their implementation and enforcements duties is appropriate.  
The Commission has an important task to perform here, since there is an incentive not to be 
too strict on their own. Compliance issues in emission trading differ from standard command 
and control regulation in typical environmental law.  
As Peeters pointed out, the classical way of enforcement in the case of command and 
control comes in the form of static obligations for firms, like binding limit values for their 
emissions, or the obligatory application of specific techniques.26 These obligations for firms 
covered do not change unless the permit is amended. In emissions trading however, the 
obligations in the emission permit are dynamic: the amount of allowances that need to be 
surrendered fluctuates depending on the exact amount of gases emitted.27 This is a 
challenging and highly complex task to bear upon the operators of covered installations and 
continuous control and oversight of this task by Member State authorities is inevitable. 
Weishaar in this regard even suggests that the ETS ‘necessitates a system that may, 
perhaps, be even more stringent than in the case under comparable command and control 
instruments’.28 
When thinking of compliance and inspection as on ongoing effort involving both operators 
and competent authorities, one has to bear in mind the complete compliance cycle from 
compliance assessment through undertaking site visits, compliance assistance by 
communication and persuasion and ultimately sanctioning. The carrying out of this 
compliance cycle includes the following activities: 
  
- Information and communication facilities 
- Site visits and consideration of the results 
- Monitoring achievements 
- Verification of self-monitoring and self-reporting   
- Controlling equipments 
                                               
23
 See for example on the fraud hitting the EU ETS: Interpol, Guide to Carbon Crime, June 2013. 
24
 Commission Regulation 994/2008/EC of 8 October 2008 for a standardised and secured system of 
registries pursuant to Directive 2003/87/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council and 
Decision 280/2004/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council, [2008] OJ L 271/3.For more on 
this see the next section.  
25
 M. Peeters, ‘Inspection and market-based regulation through emission trading: the striking reliance 
on self-monitoring, self-reporting and verification’ Utrecht Law Review (2006) 2(1), 177-195. 
26
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- Controlling systems and procedures 
- Controlling the relevant records and measurement systems 
- Controlling the emission permit to ensure that the activities described in the 
monitoring plan reflect the reality of the site in relation to the consistency and 
completeness of the monitoring of the emissions 
- Controlling the verified emissions report.29 
 
Ideally, a compliance assessment by the competent authority will be produced based upon a 
risk assessment taking into account the complexity of the installation, the level of emissions, 
the history of the installation and its operator, the time required for visits and the verifier 
report. Here, “instrument sequencing” whereby enforcement agencies dispose of a range of 
instruments, ranging from soft to hard is also of relevance. Regulators that are in a long-term 
relationship with regulatees, as is in particular the case within the dynamic context EU ETS, 
will want to foster good relationships that are conducive to sustained and long-term 
compliance. Therefore, upon becoming aware of an infringement, they will first seek to 
educate and persuade rather than to resort to the more extreme coercive measures that they 
also have at their disposal. In fact, it is the coercive powers enforcement agencies can yield 
which accounts for the effectiveness of less draconic enforcement policies. Socio-legal 
scholars refer to ‘negotiating under the shadow of the law’ to explain this dynamic. 
As will become clear from the country reports in this study, the extent to which these are 
undertaken depends to the regulatory approach chosen by the competent authorities. This 
approach in itself depends on factors such as regulatory tradition, the principles underlying 
the enforcement strategy, the form of implementation, but also to the available resources. 
Compliance systems differ among Member States and not all Member States will use the 
same instruments.  
In this regard a EU ETS Compliance Forum has been brought to live. Purpose of this Forum 
where all Member States can participate on a voluntary basis to exchange information, best 
practices and difficulties concerning the operation of the EU ETS. Specific tasks forces are 
organized where priorities are placed on the agenda. Another instrument to foster 
harmonization is the use of standardized IT systems, which in particular in the case of such a 




The EU ETS Directive requires Member States to put in place a system of penalties which is 
effective, proportionate and dissuasive but the nature of the penalties is largely left to 
Member State discretion.  There exists however an important exception to this rule. Each 
year by 30 April the latest, the operator of an installation has to surrender a number of 
allowances equal to the total emissions from that installation during the preceding calendar 
year.30 Failure to comply with that obligation will result in a penalty, in addition to the 
publication of the name of the offending operators.31 The penalty of ‘naming and shaming’ is  
a novelty in European secondary environmental legislation. The idea is that covered 
installations are usually conscious about their reputation and therefore this penalty would 
                                               
29
 See also IMPEL Report, Options and Proposals for Consistency in the Implementation of the EU 
Emissions Trading Scheme Report 4: Good Practice in Compliance and Enforcement, May 2007. 
Available on the Internet at: http://impel.eu/wp-content/uploads/2012/09/IMPEL-Report-4-Compliance-
and-Enforcement-Report-FINAL.pdf 
30
 Directive 2003/87, art. 12(3). 
31
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increase compliance.32 In addition to the excess emissions penalty, the operator is still 
obliged to surrender an amount of allowances equal to the excess emissions.33 
In a recent preliminary ruling case the question was raised by the Swedish court whether 
Article 16(3) and (4) mean that an operator who has not surrendered a sufficient number of 
emission allowances by 30 April must pay a penalty regardless of the cause of the omission, 
for example, where, although the operator had a sufficient number of emission allowances on 
30 April, as a result of an oversight, an administrative error or a technical problem it did not 
surrender them then.34 In addition, the Swedish court asked if Question 1 is answered in the 
affirmative, does Article 16(3) and (4) of Directive 2003/87 mean that the penalty will or may 
be waived or reduced for example under certain circumstances. 
The case is significant, if only because it is the first time that the CJEU pronounces on issues 
pertaining to the enforcement of the emission trading system. It is therefore worth to 
elaborate on. 
The circumstances that gave rise to the questions were chiefly as follows. As at 30 April 
2007, the Billerud companies had not surrendered the allowances equal to their emissions 
for 2006 (10 828 and 42 433 tonnes respectively).  Consequently, the Naturvårdsverket 
imposed the penalty provided for by Swedish Law No 2004:1109 implementing Directive 
2003/87, in the amount of SEK 3 959 366 for one company and SEK 15 516 051 for the 
other (EUR 433 120 and EUR 1 697 320). The Billerud companies challenged those 
penalties before the national court essentially because, as at 30 April 2007, they had 
sufficient emission allowances in their holding accounts to cover their total emissions for 
2006. They argued that this proved that they had not intended to circumvent their obligations, 
and that the alleged failure to surrender their allowances on time was due to internal 
administrative breakdown.  
The Court of Justice summarized the first question as asking whether the concept of 
punishable ‘excess emissions’ must be construed as concerning excessively polluting 
conduct per se, in which case the penalty would be payable only by operators who do not 
have the sufficient number of allowances on 30 April of each year, or whether it instead 
consists solely in the failure to surrender the allowances equal to the emissions for the 
preceding year by 30 April, irrespective of the reason for the non-surrender or the number of 
allowances actually held by the operators concerned.35 The first literal reading advocated by 
the Billerud companies, is based on a literal interpretation of the expression ‘excess 
emissions’ in Article 16(3) and (4) of Directive 2003/87, which would mean that the actual 
possession, on 30 April of the current year, of a sufficient number of allowances to cover the 
emissions for the preceding year would mitigate any penalty payable.  
The Court of Justice rejected this argument on the following grounds. First, the obligation in 
Article 12 is the only one for which Directive 2003/87 itself provides for a specific sanction, 
whereas the sanction for any other conduct contrary to its provisions is, under Article 16, left 
to the discretion of the Member States. The key role of the allowance surrender process in 
the scheme of the directive is also apparent from the fact that being ordered to pay the 
penalty does not release the operator from the obligation to surrender the corresponding 
allowances during the surrender process the following year.36  
Second, although the ultimate purpose of the emission trading regime is environmental 
protection, the infrastructure needed to attain that purpose is the strict accounting of the 
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 Gunningham, N. and P. Garbosky, Smart Regulation. Designing Environmental Policy (Oxford: 
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33
 Directive 2003/87, art. 16(3). 
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 Case C-203/12,Billerud Karlsborg AB, Billerud Skärblacka AB v Naturvårdsverket of 17 October 
2013, n.y.r.  
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issue, holding, transfer and cancellation of allowances.37 Accordingly, Article 16(3) and (4) of 
the Directive has as its object and effect to penalise not ‘polluters’ generally, but rather those 
operators whose number of emissions for the preceding year exceeds, as at 30 April of the 
current year, the number of allowances listed in the section of the surrendered allowance 
table designated for their installations for that year in the centralised registry of the Member 
State to which they report under Article 52 of Regulation No 2216/2004. This – and not the 
emissions which are per se excessive - is how the concept of ‘excess emissions’ is therefore 
to be construed.38 The Court of Justice therefore concluded that the obligation imposed by 
Directive 2003/87 is not as a mere obligation to hold the allowances covering the emissions 
for the preceding year on 30 April of the current year, but is an obligation to surrender those 
allowances by 30 April in order to have them cancelled in the Community registry, which is 
intended to ensure that an accurate accounting record is kept of the allowances.39  
The Court of Justice interpreted the second question as whether Article 16(3) and (4) of 
Directive must be interpreted as meaning that it may be varied by a national court on the 
basis of the principle of proportionality. The Court denied such a role for the principle of 
proportionality for the following reasons. First, the European Union legislature must be 
allowed a broad discretion when it is asked to intervene in an area which entails political, 
economic and social choices on its part, and in which it is called upon to undertake complex 
assessments. Hence, in its judicial review of the exercise of such powers, the Court cannot 
substitute its own assessment for that of the European Union legislature. It could, at most, 
find fault with its legislative choice only if it appeared manifestly incorrect or if the resultant 
disadvantages for certain economic operators were wholly disproportionate to the 
advantages otherwise offered.40  
 Similarly, when the European Union legislature has to assess the future effects of legislation 
to be enacted although those effects cannot be accurately foreseen, its assessment is open 
to criticism only if it appears manifestly incorrect in the light of the information available to it 
at the time of the adoption of the legislation in question.41  Therefore, the penalty for excess 
emissions provided for by Directive cannot be considered to be contrary to the principle of 
proportionality on the ground that there is no possibility for the amount to be varied by a 
national court.42 The European Union legislature viewed the surrender obligation provided for 
in Article 12(3) of the directive and the lump sum penalty enforcing that obligation provided 
for in Article 16(3) and (4), without any flexibility other than a transitional lowering of the 
amount, as necessary in the pursuit of the legitimate objective of establishing an efficient 
carbon dioxide equivalent allowance trading scheme, in order to prevent certain operators or 
market intermediaries from being tempted to circumvent or manipulate the scheme by 
speculating abusively on prices, quantities, time limits or complex financial products.43  
In addition, the four month time period gives operators a reasonable amount of time in which 
to comply with their surrender obligation, and the penalty of EUR 40 per tonne of carbon 
dioxide equivalent allowances not surrendered as at 30 April does not carry drawbacks which 
are incommensurate with the advantages to be gained by the European Union’s fulfilment of 
its commitments under the Kyoto Protocol.44  
Although the two questions are closely related, the most important aspect resides in the role 
of the principle of proportionality (a fundamental principle of EU law) in the application of 
penalties pursuant to Article 16(3) and (4). That question, obviously, can only be assessed in 
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light of the purpose of Directive/EC, which is ultimately what the Swedish court’s first 
question helped to clarify.  
Once the CJEU established in response to the first question that the immediate purpose of 
the Directive is the strict accounting of the issue, holding, transfer and cancellation of 
allowances, the assessment of the proportionality of an interpretation of Article 16(3) and (4) 
as meaning that the penalty specified is fully payable for any failure to surrender the 
allowances equal to the emissions for the preceding year by 30 April, irrespective of the 
reason for the non-surrender or the number of allowances actually held by the operators 
concerned, must be assessed in that light. For this reason, it is understandable that the Court 
has denied a role for the principle of proportionality in the way advocated by the Billerud 
companies. This outcome is not so much an example of the Court showing its technocratic 
pedigree as has been asserted by Peeters (an accusation rarely levelled against the CJEU 
mostly known for its activism),45 but rather is consistent with the teleological interpretation 
method traditionally employed by the Court. 
The message for operators is a simple one: make sure you have your house in order or risk 
paying a substantial fine. The fact that this fine may reflect earlier expectations of market 
prices which, with the benefit of hindsight, have now proved to be unrealistically high is not in 
itself a reason to question the wisdom of the Court to deny a role for national courts to take 
the sharp edges off Article 16(3) and (4) by allowing them to sweeten the pill through a 
general recourse to the principle of subsidiarity. Rather, the proportionality of the sanctioning 
system must be assessed on the basis of the seriousness of the problem the Directive seeks 
to address (and, judging by the most recent IPCC reports, this problem has become more 
rather than less serious since the amount of € 40 was fixed by the EU legislator), and not 
with reference to fluctuating market values of each emission allowance surrendered. If, for 
whatever reason, the penalty system thus imposed proves disproportionate, it is for the EU 
legislator to intervene by amending the Directive’s relevant provisions. To allow national 
courts to perform this role by opening the door for national and inconsistent applications of 
the principle of subsidiarity would give rise to the kind of distortions which the Directive is 
precisely intended to prevent. 
 
3.1.4 Member State Sanctions 
 
For other breaches of the rules on MRV, or other obligations concerning the functioning of 
the ETS Member States have to put in place a system of penalties that is effective, 
proportionate and dissuasive.46 For instance, when monitoring and reporting obligations are 
not followed and as a result essential data is missing or nor accurate. If this is the case, it will 
not be clear how many allowances must be surrendered in reality. This could obviously 
seriously impair the effectiveness of the ETS and Member States thus have an obligation to 
establish an enforcement strategy that includes sanctions for these infringements. 
Considering the diversity in enforcement strategies among the Member States, Article 21 of 
the Directive is of specific interest. According to this provision Member States are required to 
report every year on the application of the Directive. The Commission has developed a 
format for this questionnaire that also contributes attention to compliance issues as have 
been discussed above.47 This format has been improved as of 2013; reports now have to 
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 M. Peeters, case commentary in M en R 2014/21. Pp 99-100. 
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 Directive 2003/87, Art. 16(1).  
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include much more specified information on all issues relating the functioning of the EU ETS. 
On the basis of these reports the Commission has to publish a report on the application of 
the Directive within three months of receiving the reports of the Member States.48 In the past, 
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3.2 Towards more harmonization and centralization: description of 
amendments to EU ETS legislation aimed at improving compliance 
 
The EU legal framework for the ETS is both complex and wide in scope. Although the ETS is 
a market based instrument, which leads an outsider to believe that the market mechanism 
will do the work that normally, with command-and-control instruments, would be performed 
by legal instruments, law actually plays a significant role in the functioning of the system. The 
amount of rules that had to be put in place to have the carbon market function orderly and 
reliably is enormous. In addition, EU ETS law is constantly changing. In part, these changes 
were intended from the start. It has always been planned to initially have three trading 
phases, with phase I being the start-up and learning phase, phase II the first “real” trading 
phase aimed at achieving the necessary reductions for the 2012 Kyoto Protocol obligations, 
and phase III the first post-Kyoto trading phase aimed at substantial further emission 
reductions. Lessons drawn during the first phase(s) lead to improvements in the next 
phase(s). Unexpected events took place as well, such as the discovery of the ETS being 
misused by criminals for money laundering and other criminal activities in 2009, and the 
extremely low price as a consequence of the economic and financial crisis around 2009-
2013. This has led to constant changes in the legal framework. These changes will be dealt 
with below, with a special focus on monitoring, verification and compliance. This is 
appropriate since it enhances our understanding of how the EU ETS has been evolved. 
 
3.2.1 Phase I (2005-2007) 
 
a. General 
In 2005, the EU ETS was launched. Phase I of the ETS was designed to be a start-up and 
learning phase, mainly meant to test the effectiveness of the ETS as set up by Directive/EC 
on the ETS49 and Directive 2004/101/EC on linking the ETS to the CDM and JI instruments 
of the Kyoto Protocol.50 It was a stand-alone trading period in the sense that allowances 
could not be banked for use in the 2nd phase. The number of allowances was mainly 
determined by the Member States in their National Allocation Plans (NAP) but had to be in 
line with the Kyoto Protocol target.51 These allowances were given away for free to power 
generators and energy-intensive industrial sectors. As these installations also require an 
integrated environmental permit under the IPPC Directive,52 the ETS Directive brought 
changes to the IPPC Directive so as to make sure that no permit conditions are included in 
the IPPC-permit that focus on emissions covered by the ETS Directive. In phase 1, the ETS 
Directive only covered CO2 emissions. As a consequence of over-allocation by the Member 
States and the absence of reliable emissions data the total allocation of EU ETS allowances 
greatly exceeded demand. In 2007, the price of phase 1 allowances, therefore, dropped to 0. 
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 Directive 2003/87/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 13 October 2003 
establishing a scheme for greenhouse gas emission allowance trading within the Community and 
amending Council Directive 96/61/EC, [2003]  OJ L 275/32. 
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b. Monitoring, reporting and verification 
Directive 2003/87/EC set a few very basic and simple requirements on monitoring and 
reporting in Article 14 and on verification in Article 15. The duty to monitor emissions, to 
ensure a proper reporting of emissions after the end of each year, and the duty to ensure 
that the reports were verified is laid upon the Member States.53 A more detailed set of rules is 
given in the Annexes to this Directive and in European Commission Guidelines. 
Annex IV holds the principles for monitoring and reporting. It states, for instance, that 
emissions shall be monitored either by calculation or on the basis of measurement. The 
Annex then provides a formula for calculation (Activity data x Emissions factor x Oxidation 
factor) and states that for measurements, standardised or accepted methods have to be 
used that are corroborated by a supporting calculation of emissions. Finally, Annex IV lists 
the information that needs to be reported on for each installation. This includes not only  the 
above mentioned information used in calculations and measurements, but also information 
about uncertainty in these calculations and measurements. 
In addition to Annex IV, there is an extensive and very detailed set of guidelines  for the 
monitoring and reporting of greenhouse gas emissions issued by the European Commission 
on the basis of Article 14.54 These guidelines are both general guidelines that apply to all 
installations, guidelines for combustion emissions for all installations, and activity specific 
guidelines for: mineral oil refineries, coke ovens, metal ore roasting and sintering 
installations, pig iron and steel installations, cement clinker production installations, lime 
production installations, glass manufacture installations, ceramic products manufacturing, 
and pulp and paper-producing installations. 
Article 15 states that the installation’s report on emissions has to be verified as satisfactory. 
Annex V details the criteria for verification. It gives both general principles and 
methodologies. It is a general principle that verification has to have a high degree of certainty 






This means that: 
 
- the reported data are free of inconsistencies 
- the collection of data has been carried out in accordance with the applicable scientific 
standards, and 
- the relevant records of the installation are complete and consistent. 
 
Another general principle is that the verifier is given access to all sites and information in 
relation to the subject of the verification. 
As to the methodologies, it is regulated that the verification is based on a strategic analysis of 
all activities carried out in the installation, and that the verification ‘where appropriate’ is 
carried out on the site of the installation, using spot checks to determine the reliability of the 
reported data and information. A risk analysis has to show the risk of error of the monitoring 
and reporting procedure. 
An important administrative element of the ETS, related to monitoring and enforcement, is 
the registry. Article 19 provides for a standardised and secure system of electronic registries 
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which tracks the issuance, holding, transfer and cancellation of all allowances.55 Extensive 
and very detailed rules to standardise and secure an electronic registry system have been 
laid down in a separate Regulation 2216/2004.56 These rules include, for instance, the duty 
for each Member State to designate a Registry Administrator, reporting requirements and 
provisions on confidentiality. The standards in the Regulation also aim at facilitating an 
effective communication between the EU ETS and the UNFCCC transaction log. A Central 
Administrator is designated by the Commission under Article 20. The Central Administrator 
conducts automated checks on each transaction in registries through the independent 
transaction log to ensure there are no irregularities in the issue, transfer and cancellation of 
allowances. The Central Administrator’s tasks have also been worked out in more detail in 
the Regulation mentioned above.57 When irregularities are identified, then the Member State 
is not allowed to register the transaction or any further transactions relating to the allowances 
concerned, until the irregularities have been resolved. 
 
c. Compliance 
The penalties for non-compliance with the ETS have been laid down in Article 16. Again, the 
Member States are the main players here: they bear the duty to lay down rules on penalties 
in national legislation and they have to make sure that these are implemented. Several 
sanctions apply: 
 
- the names of the operators who are in breach of the requirement to surrender sufficient 
allowances have to be published (‘naming and shaming’) (Article 16(2)); 
- excess emissions penalty of EUR 40 for each tonne of CO2 emitted by the installation 
without surrendered allowance (Article 16(4)) and 
- duty to surrender ‘missing’ allowances next year (Article 16(4)); 
- suspension of trading in case of absence of satisfactory verification (Article 15). 
 
3.2.2 Phase II (2008-2012) 
 
a. General 
The 2nd phase was the first “real” trading phase. A number of changes were implemented: 
 
- the European Commission tightened the cap by 6.5% compared to phase I as a reaction 
to the over-allocation in that phase. These tightened caps were laid down in a 
Commission Decision;58 
                                               
55
 The legal basis for the establishment of these national registries is Decision 280/2004/EC of 11 
February 2004 of the European Parliament and of the Council concerning a mechanism for monitoring 
Community greenhouse gas emissions and for implementing the Kyoto Protocol, [2004] OJ L 49/1. 
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 Commission Regulation 2216/2004/EC of 21 December 2004 for a standardised and secured 
system of registries pursuant to Directive 2003/87/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council 
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Central Administrator’s tasks. 
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- several Member States, most notably the UK and the Netherlands, distributed part of 
their allowances through auctions (under the revised Directive, they were obliged, 
though, to at least issue 90% of the allowances for free); 
- businesses were allowed to buy ERUs and CERs on the market and exchange these for 
allowances (up to a certain maximum, set in the NAP), thus stimulating the financing of 
projects under the Kyoto Protocol’s flexible instruments;59 
- a Decision was implemented to avoid that emission reductions are counted twice 
(example: a wind farm project generates allowances but also feeds electricity in the 
electricity grid thus making allowances available for the market);60 
- the penalty was raised from € 40 to € 100 per tonne (Article 16(3), see further under 
‘compliance’); 
- during the last year of phase 2 (2012), emissions by aviation activities were included in 
the ETS, allowances were issued largely based on historical emissions;61 
- Iceland, Liechtenstein and Norway joined the EU ETS; 
- the UK, the Netherlands and Austria used the voluntary unilateral option to extend the 
ETS to include nitrous oxide emissions from the production of nitric acid (Article 24); 
- during the last year of phase II (2012), the registry of allowances was transferred from 
national registries to the single Union registry operated by the Commission (see below);62 
- the so-called ‘regulatory procedure with scrutiny’ was incorporated in the ETS-Directive 
for comitology decisions, i.e., the decisions of the Commission that are prepared by a 
committee (most Commission decisions under the ETS Directive are comitology 
decisions), giving the Council and Parliament the power to object against the proposed 
measures).63 
 
b. Monitoring, reporting and verification 
The extension of the ETS to include airline activities resulted in many changes in the legal 
provisions on monitoring, reporting and verification, such as new provisions on: 
- the duty for each aircraft operator to submit a monitoring and reporting plan to the 
competent authority in the administering Member State64 (Article 3g); 
- changes to the provisions on monitoring (Article 14) and verification (Article 15) largely 
aimed at applying the existing monitoring and verification rules to aircraft operators. 
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 Although already regulated under Directive 2004/101/EC, this opportunity only became available in 
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- Big new sections on aviation activities were added to Annexes IV on monitoring and 
reporting, setting calculation formula for CO2 emissions (fuel consumption x emission 
factor) and tonne-kilometres for allowance allocation (distance x payload), and specific 
monitoring and reporting requirements for emissions and tonne-kilometre data. 
- Annex V was amended to include specific verification requirements for aviation emission 
reports. 
- The possibility for the Commission to request the assistance of Eurocontrol (Article 18b) 
was added. 
 
Another important change in phase II was caused by the adoption of a new set of guidelines 
for monitoring and reporting.65 Many changes were made in comparison to the previous 
guidelines. In brief, the changes were particularly aimed at rendering the monitoring system 
more cost-effective by reducing costs associated to monitoring and reporting. Examples of 
this are the adoption of a more simple system for installations with annual emissions of less 
than 25,000 tonnes of CO2 and the adoption of less stringent uncertainty requirements for 
certain emissions. 
Towards the end of phase I (July 2007), changes were also made to the registry system, as 
was already stated above, mainly aimed at improving communication with the UNFCCC 
independent transaction log and to further detail the tasks of the Central Administrator in 
Regulation 2216/2004/EC.66 Only one year later, though, in October 2008, that regulation 
was completely replaced by Regulation 994/2008/EC (although parts of the old Regulation 
remained active to the end of phase 2).67 The new Regulation further integrates the Member 
States’ registries and the Community registry into the newly established Community 
Independent Transaction Log (CITL). Substantial changes were also necessary because of 
decisions made at the level of the UNFCCC and the Kyoto Protocol. One of these, for 
instance, is the duty for each registry to contain at least one Party holding account, one 
cancellation account, one retirement account, and one ETS AAU (assigned account unit) 
deposit account, next to the national accounts (one national allowance holding account and 
one national allowance deletion account). 
Two years later, in October 2010, Regulation 994/2008/EC again was replaced by the new 
Regulation 920/2010/EU.68 This regulation prepared major changes to be implemented as of 
1 January 2012. As of that date, the Member State registries were replaced by a single 
Union Registry and a European Union Transaction Log (EUTL). This was deemed necessary 
to improve not only the coherence of the registry, but in particular also to make the system 
more robust and less vulnerable to fraud (see further below under compliance). Also, the 
inclusion of the airline sector in the ETS necessitated changes. Finally, a centralized Union 
Registry was also necessary to implement the profound changes enacted for the third phase 
(see further below).69 
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c. Compliance 
A number of changes in phase II were explicitly aimed at improving compliance. First of all, 
as already stated, the penalty was raised from € 40 to € 100 EUR per tonne CO2 equivalent 
emitted by an installation for which the operator did not surrender allowances. This raise was 
already in the original text of the ETS Directive (from 2003), but only took effect as of phase 
2 (Article 16(3)). 
To accommodate the inclusion of the aviation sector in the ETS, a specific and severe 
sanction was added, which has to be used only as an ultimum remedium: the possibility to 
impose an operating ban on the aircraft operator who fails to comply with the requirements of 
the ETS Directive (Article 16(5)/6(12)). 
As explained above, in Regulation 920/2010/EU, the rules on the registry were changed in 
2010 to improve the integrity of the ETS. In 2009, it was observed that there was a significant 
increase in the occurrence of VAT-fraud, money laundering and other criminal activities. As a 
consequence, rules on persons involved in the transaction administration were tightened. 
National administrators, for instance, can now refuse to open an account in case the person 
requesting the account opening is under investigation for being involved in fraud involving 
allowances or Kyoto units, money laundering, terrorist financing or other serious crimes in 
which the account may be an instrument, or any other reason set out in national law.70 In 
addition, accounts have to have at least two authorised representatives next to the person 
opening the account, and the obligations of these persons (account holder and authorised 
representatives) have been laid down in Annex VI of Regulation 920/2010/EU, such as the 
duty to ensure that the posted data are accurate. Regulation 920/2010/EU also contains 
many provisions with technical requirements of the registries system aimed at preventing 
security breaches. If there is a security breach, the Central Administrator may suspend 
access to the EUTL. If one of the registries is not maintained or operated in accordance with 
the provisions of the Regulation, the Commission may instruct the Central Administrator to 
suspend the acceptance of some or all processes.71 Automated checking of all processes is 
required.72 If discrepancies are discovered, the process concerned has to be terminated and 
the relevant account holder has to be informed on this.73 
 
3.2.3 Phase III (2013-2020) 
 
a. General 
A major overhaul of the EU ETS took place in the years running up to phase 3, which started 
in 2013. Directive 2009/29/EC brought many profound changes to the ETS, largely aimed at 
centralizing the ETS.74 A more harmonized ETS ‘is imperative in order to better exploit the 
benefits of emission trading, to avoid distortions in the internal market and to facilitate the 
linking of emissions trading systems’.75 Following are the most important changes as of 
phase 3: 
                                                                                                                                                   
the European Parliament and of the Council and Decision 280/2004/EC of the European Parliament 
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- abolishment of the National Allocation Plans, and the adoption of one EU wide cap 
instead (Article 9); 
- a linear decrease of the cap by 1.74% (Article 9). 
- Allowances are in principle auctioned (Article 10). The auctioning process has been 
extensively regulated in Regulation 1031/2010/EU.76 Free allocation is only allowed in a 
limited number of cases and under strict conditions, such as for district heating, high 
efficiency cogeneration, new entrants (except in case of electricity production), in support 
of certain high-intensive industries in the event of carbon leakage, in support of 
modernisation of electricity production (Articles 10a/10c). The amount of auctioned 
allowances will rise from a little over 40% in 2013 to 70% in 2027. 
- Small installations with emissions of less than 25,000 tonnes of carbon dioxide equivalent 
can be completely excluded from the ETS by a Member State provided equivalent 
emission reductions are achieved (Article 27). 
- The Commission has the power to intervene in the market through postponing 
(‘backloading’) or bringing forward auctioning, in case of a surplus of allowances (Article 
10(4))77 or in the event of excessive price fluctuations (Article 29a) respectively. If the 
carbon market, more in general, is not functioning properly, the Commission has to report 
this to the Parliament and the Council, if necessary accompanied by proposals for 
improvement. 
- Six options to more drastically reduce the high surplus of allowances have been 
discussed in 2013:  a) increasing the EU’s greenhouse gas emissions reduction target for 
2020 from 20% to 30% below 1990 levels, b) retiring a certain number of phase 3 
allowances permanently, c) revising the 1.74% annual reduction in the number of 
allowances to make the reduction steeper, d) bringing more sectors into the EU ETS, e) 
limiting access to international credits, f) introducing discretionary price management 
mechanisms such as a price management reserve. These discussions lead to a 
proposal, submitted by the Commission in 2014, for the establishment of a market 
stability reserve.78  
- Phase III originally was supposed to see the expansion of the ETS to the first79 third 
country under Article 25: Australia was to fully link its ETS in 2018, with an interim-link 
available as of 2015.80 After the 2013 federal elections in Australia, however, it is unlikely 
that these plans will materialize. Negotiations with Switzerland are underway. 
- A number of industries were brought under the ETS, and two greenhouse gases were 
added (perfluorocarbon emissions from the aluminium industry and nitrous oxide 
emissions from certain installations) through changes in Annex I. 
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 Commission Regulation 1031/2010/EU of 20 November 2010 on the timing, administration and 
other aspects of auctioning of greenhouse gas emission allowances pursuant to Directive 2003/87/EC 
of the European Parliament and of the Council establishing a scheme for greenhouse gas emission 
allowances trading within the Community, [2010] OJ L 302/1. 
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 As a reaction to the surplus of allowances that the EU had in 2012 and 2013 as a consequence of 
the economic crisis, it was decided to ‘backload’ a number of allowances from the 2014-2016 auctions 
to the 2019-2020 auctions. This has been laid down in Commission Regulation 176/2014/EU of 25 
February 2014 amending Regulation (EU) No 1031/2010 in particular to determine the volumes of 
greenhouse gas emission allowances to be auctioned in 2013-20, [2014] OJ L 56/11. 
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 Proposal for a Decision of the European Parliament and of the Council concerning the 
establishment and operation of a market stability reserve for the Union greenhouse gas emission 
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b. Monitoring, reporting and verification 
Although phase II already saw many changes on monitoring, reporting and verification, the 
start of phase III coincided with many more changes on these issues. First and foremost, the 
‘guidelines’ on monitoring and reporting based on the old version of Article 14 of the ETS 
Directive, are now ‘rules’ laid down in Regulation 601/2012/EU, which means that they are 
directly legally binding for all authorities and all industries in the EU.81 The central element of 
this Regulation is the duty for each operator or aircraft operator to have a monitoring plan, 
approved by the competent authority, on the basis of which all monitoring will take place. 
Content, submission, modification and other aspects concerning the monitoring plan have 
been extensively regulated in Articles 11-16 of the Regulation. Many other, smaller, 
improvements to the monitoring and reporting rules were made as well. 
A similar development took place with regard to verification. Following a change of Article 15 
by Directive 2009/29/EC,82 Regulation 600/2012/EU was adopted with the aim to fully 
harmonize and integrate the rules for the accreditation of verifiers, more specifically the 
conditions for accreditation and withdrawal of accreditation, for mutual recognition and for 
peer evaluation of accreditation bodies.83 
As indicated under phase II, the rules on the registry were fundamentally changed to 
accompany the centralization of the EU ETS as brought about by Directive 2009/29 through 
the institution of one Union Registry. Regulation 1193/2011/EU incorporates most of the 
2010 changes on verification, adds specific rules to make sure that aviation activities are well 
represented in the EUTL, and makes the necessary links to the Auctioning Regulation 
1031/2010.84 In 2013, Regulation 1193/2011/EU was replaced by Regulation 389/2013/EU, 
in which a range of various amendments were made, for instance on keeping the Union 
Registry rules compatible with the post 2012 Kyoto agreements (or lack thereof), and on 
greater transparency of allocation of allowances free of charge by Member States.85 
The Auctioning Regulation grants a wide range of monitoring powers to three separate 
institutions: 
 
1) the auction monitor 
2) the auction platform 
3) national authorities for the monitoring of financial and credit institutions. 
 
The auction monitor monitors all auction processes (Article 24).86 The auction monitor has to 
report on the proper implementation of the auctions with respect to fair and open access, 
transparency, price formation, and technical and operational aspects. He has to report any 
failure to comply with the contract appointing an auction platform, any evidence of anti-
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 Commission Regulation 601/2012/EU of 21 June 2012 on the monitoring and reporting of 
greenhouse gas emissions pursuant to Directive 2003/87/EC of the European Parliament and of the 
Council, [2012] OJ L 181/30, based on the new Art. 14, as revised by Directive 2009/29/EC, supra 
note 26. 
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 Supra note 26. 
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 Commission Regulation 600/2012/EU of 21 June 2012 on the verification of greenhouse gas 
emission reports and tonne-kilometre reports and the accreditation of verifiers pursuant to Directive 
2003/87/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council, [2012] OJ L 181/1. 
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 Commission Regulation 389/2013/EU of 2 May 2013 establishing a Union Registry pursuant to 
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of the European Parliament and of the Council establishing a scheme for greenhouse gas emission 








308481_ENTRACTE_D2.4_Report of the Legal Implementation of the EU ETS at Member State Level 30 
competitive behaviour or market abuse, the impact of the auctions on the market position of 
the auction platform on the secondary market, information about the number, nature and 
status of complaints, etc. (Article 25). The auction monitor is also entitled to observe the 
conduct of the auctions and, in order to do so, has to be provided with all information in the 
possession of auctioneers, auction platforms and all competent national authorities, including 
the authorities supervising credit institutions and investments firms. All these institutions have 
to actively cooperate with the auction monitor (Article 53). 
The auction platform has to monitor the bidders. The auction platform has to scrutinize bids 
to ensure that the bidding behaviour of bidders is consistent with the platform’s knowledge of 
the customer, maintain effective arrangements and procedures for the regular monitoring of 
the compliance of bidders, and monitor transactions undertaken by persons admitted to bid 
in order to identify unfair or disorderly auctioning conditions or conduct that may invoke 
market abuse (Article 54). 
National authorities instituted to monitor financial and credit institutions for the use of the 
financial system for the purpose of money laundering and terrorist financing, based on the 
Anti-Money Laundering Directive,87 have to also monitor the auctioning under the ETS for 
check for transactions for the same purpose (Article 55). 
 
c. Compliance 
Directive 2009/29/EC did not bring about changes as to the issue of compliance. The new 
Regulations on the Union Registry and on Auctioning, however do, although the Union 
Registry Regulation 1193/2011/EU more or less only incorporates the provisions on 
compliance that were already present in Regulation 920/2010/EU as discussed above under 
phase II. In 2013, both regulations (1193/2011/EU and 920/2010/EU) were repealed and 
replaced by Regulation 389/2013,88 without major changes as to the rules on compliance. 
The Auctioning Regulation 1031/2010 has many provisions on compliance. The provisions 
grant enforcement powers to: 
 
1) the auction platform, and to 
2) national authorities for the financial markets, as established under: 
a. the Market Abuse Directive, or 
b. the Anti-Money Laundering Directive. 
 
First of all, Article 21 states that persons wilfully or repeatedly breaching the Auctioning 
Regulation have to be sanctioned by the auction platform by refusal, revocation or 
suspension of admission to bid in auctions. The same sanction applies in case the auctioning 
platform suspects money laundering, terrorist financing, criminal activity or market abuse 
(unless this would frustrate efforts by the competent national authorities to apprehend the 
perpetrators).89 Under some conditions (such as the duty to first allow the person concerned 
to give a response to the allegations), similar sanctions can be imposed on persons 
negligently in breach of the Regulation, or persons who otherwise behave in a manner that is 
prejudicial to the orderly or efficient conduct of an auction. Another sanctioning power of the 
auction platform is to set a maximum bid-size, or take any other remedial measures 
necessary to mitigate an actual or potential discernable risk of market abuse, money 
                                               
87
 Directive 2005/60/EC of 26 October 2005 of the European Parliament and of the Council on the 
prevention of the use of the financial system for the purpose of money laundering and terrorist 
financing, [2005] OJ L 309/15. 
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 Commission Regulation 389/2013/EU of 2 May 2013 establishing a Union Registry pursuant to 
Directive 2003/87/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council, Decisions 280/2004/EC and 
406/2009/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council and repealing Commission Regulations 
920/2010/EU and 1193/2011/EU, [2013] OJ L 122/1. 
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laundering, terrorist financing or other criminal activity, after consultation with the 
Commission (Article 57). Auctioning platforms are obliged to inform the financial intelligence 
unit instituted under the Anti-Money Laundering Directive when they suspect money 
laundering, terrorist financing or criminal activity is being or has been committed (Article 55). 
Auctioning platforms have to inform the competent national authorities for the investigation 
and prosecution of market abuse when they suspect market abuse (Article 56). 
These national financial authorities have an important compliance role under the Auctioning 
Regulation as well. The Auctioning Regulation has a set of rules to prevent market abuse, for 
instance through using inside information. There is a prohibition of insider dealing (Article 38-
40) and a prohibition of market manipulation (Article 41). Supervision and enforcement of 
these prohibitions has been put in the hands of the authorities for the financial markets, as 
established under the Market Abuse Directive (Article 43).90 The rules of the latter Directive 
apply, so these authorities have the right to a) have access to any document in any form 
whatsoever, and to receive a copy of it, b) demand information from any person, c) carry out 
on-site inspections, d) require existing telephone and existing data traffic records, e) require 
the cessation of any practice that is contrary to the provisions adopted in the implementation 
of the above provisions, f) suspend trading, g) request the freezing and/or sequestration of 
assets, h) request temporary prohibition of professional activity.91 Member States have the 
obligation to impose effective, proportionate and dissuasive administrative sanctions against 
the persons responsible for non-compliance. Criminal proceedings may also be instituted if a 
Member State so decides.92 The Market Abuse Directive is currently being revised. One of 
the aims of this revision is to reinforce the investigative and administrative sanctioning 
powers of regulators, for instance by criminalising offenses against the Directive at the EU 
level.93 
The national authorities under the Anti-Money Laundering Directive have the power to take 
the necessary measures to ensure compliance of an auction platform with the customer due 





Contrary to general belief, it is clear that monitoring and enforcement efforts of an emissions 
trading mechanism are much more intensive than with regular command and control type 
instruments.94 The EU adopted literally dozens of rules and regulations of various legal forms 
to achieve a reliable compliance mechanism of the EU ETS. Several conclusions can be 
drawn from the above overview of the continuous changes brought about to the compliance 
mechanism: 
 
- The entire compliance cycle of monitoring, reporting, verification and sanctioning is 
essential for the success of the ETS, but by nature very complex. 
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 Directive 2003/6/EC of 28 January 2003 of the European Parliament and of the Council on insider 
dealing and market manipulation (market abuse), [2003] OJ L 96/16. 
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 Art. 12 of Directive 2003/6/EC. 
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 Art. 14 of Directive 2003/6/EC. 
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http://ec.europa.eu/internal_market/securities/abuse/index_en.htm. 
94
 As already predicted in 2006 by M. Peeters, Inspection and market-based regulation through 
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- The regulatory framework for compliance has improved considerably over the 2005-2013 
period, mostly thanks to tightened rules at the EU level and, generally, centralization of 
the EU ETS. 
- The instances of fraud and criminal activities in the past have been addressed through 
tightened rules under market abuse and anti-money laundering legislation. 
- The compliance cycle, although now more harmonized at EU level, still largely depends 
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3.3   Case study: Germany 
 
In the 2008-2012 commitment period, German emissions were 24.7 percent lower than 1990 
levels.  Germany has an ambitious climate policy in place that coincides with the decision to 
face out nuclear power. A wide range of instruments is applied to convert the energy sector 
into renewables (with the aim to have an 80% supply of renewable energies by 2050).  Much 
attention, therefore, is focused on instruments that promote renewable energy and energy 
efficiency like taxes and subsidies. The ETS is “just” one of the instruments among many in 
the energy and climate legal package, and is considered to play only a modest role in the 
package. The successful reduction of emissions in the 2008-2012 period, therefore, cannot 
be attributed to the ETS, but to the much wider energy policy aimed at sharply reducing 
dependence on fossil energy sources (known as the Energie Wende). Nevertheless, the ETS 
clearly contributes to the good results. In the second emissions trading period, installation 
operators reduced emissions by 57 million tonnes annually; the German cap went down with 
7 percent compared to the first trading period.  
In 2012, 1,709 installations participate in emissions trading in Germany (as of September 
2012). The German Emissions Trading budget on average amounted to 451.8 million annual 
emission allowances in the second trading period. In 2012, emissions were slightly higher at 
452.6 million tonnes. In that year, 457 million emission allowances were available to the 
operators: about 416 million were issued for free. In 2012, German companies surrendered 
139.9 million carbon credits (CERs/ERUs) from CDM or JI projects to meet their obligations. 
Compared to the 457 million newly issued emission allowances, then a surplus of 144.5 
million allowances resulted in 2012. The situation is quite different for individual installations 
and industries: in total the operators of large energy installations must acquire additional 
allowances. In this period, all other industries can retain or sell some of their free emission 
allowances.95 
 
3.3.1 Legal Implementation EU ETS 
 
In Germany, an extensive set of Acts and Ordinances was created to implement the EU’s 
ETS Directive. The core legal framework is provided by the Greenhouse Gas Emissions 
Trading Act (TEHG; Gesetz über den Handel mit Berechtigungen zur Emission von 
Treibhausgasen).96 The TEHG has provisions on all elements of the ETS, such as the 
issuing of the GHG permit, monitoring and control, the keeping of a national record and 
national and international reporting.  There exists a range of ordinances and other Acts on 
some specific elements, such as Data Collection Ordinances for the various trading 
phases,97 Auctioning Ordinances for various periods,98 Allocation Act, 99 Allocation 
Ordinance,100 Project Mechanisms Act,101  Project Mechanisms Fee Act,102 Emissions trading 
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 UBA/DEHSt, Carbon Dioxide Emissions from Installations subject to Emissions Trading in 2012 
(summary), Berlin 2013, p. 2-3, see 
http://www.dehst.de/EN/Service/Publications/publications_node.html.  
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Cost Ordinance. 103 Some of these have been repealed after parts of the ETS have been 
centralized at EU level as part of the preparation for the third trading phase. 
In Germany, it was decided to have two permits to implement the EU ETS Directive: the 
Emissions permit (Emissionsgenehmigung, § 4 TEHG) and the Monitoring permit, issued 
after the approval of the Monitoringplan (Überwachungsplangenehmigung, § 6(2) TEHG). 
For installations that need a permit under the Industrial Emissions Act (BImSchG: 
Bundesimmissionsschutzgesetz), which is used to implement the EU Industrial Emissions 
Directive, the GHG emissions permit has been integrated into that permit (§ 4(4) TEHG). 
Almost all installations that are part of the EU ETS need such a permit. 
 
3.3.2 National competent authority 
 
a. Deutsche Emissionshandelsstelle 
The agency responsible for emissions trading in Germany is the Deutsche 
Emissionshandelsstelle (DEHSt, German Emissions Trading Authority). It was set up within 
the framework of the Federal Environment Agency (Umweltbundesambt, UBA) and has 
approximately 150 employees. They coordinate and inform the other authorities involved 
(both at federal and Länder level), support the work of the verifying bodies and they are the 
Designated National Authority for CDM projects and the Designated Focal Point for JI 
projects. DEHSt primarily works electronically with their partners. This applies to the 
application and allocation of allowances as well as Registry account management and 
annual emissions reporting. The DEHSt play a central role in the monitoring and compliance 
cycle, as it is responsible for the approval of the monitoring plan, and, hence issuing the 
Monitoring permit and checking whether the installation complies with the Monitoring permit. 
With DEHSt, there specific enforcement arrangements for the ETS. Of the 135 inspectors 
working at DEHSt, 40-50 are devoted to inspecting compliance by installations (i.e., checking 
emission reports, monitoring reports etc.).104 
 
b. Federal Emissions permit authorities 
The GHG emissions permit is issued (and enforced) by the federal authorities for industrial 
emissions, responsible for environmental permitting system under the BImSchG (see above). 
As, for most installations, the Emissions permit has been integrated into the general 
environmental permit under the BImSchG, the competent federal authority in the relevant 
region (Land) for that permit inspects and enforces the GHG emissions permit. As most 
installations fall under this category, these authorities are important players in Germany. 
Others, however, may be competent as well for the GHG emissions permit. Enforcement of 
the GHG emissions permit can be in the hands of (§ 19 TEHG): 
 
a) For installations that also need a permit under the BImSchG, the competent authority 
under that Acts, which is a federal authority with offices in each region (Land). 
b) For aviation activities, the federal aviation agency (Luftfahrt-Bundesamt), 
c) For all other activities, the federal environment agency (Umweltbundesamt), in 
particular the DEHSt. 
 
The federal emissions authorities, in their inspections, do not specifically check GHG 
emissions. They primarily focus on the environmental issues covered by the EU Industrial 
Emissions Directive.105 
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c. Cooperation between DEHSt and federal emissions authorities 
Both competent authorities work together in a joint platform. In 2013, it was decided to do 
joint inspections. According to the DEHSt, cooperation with the federal emissions authorities 
is important because they have the local expertise: they know the installation, the operator. 
The DEHSt has its own inspection powers, but they deliberately chose opt for collaborative 
inspections.106 
 
3.3.3 National Allocation Plan  
 
As in all Member States, national allocation plans were abolished for the third trading phase. 
Like in a number of countries, there has been an over-allocation under the national allocation 
plans, particularly in the first trading phase. This first phase is generally considered to be a 
failure, not just because of over allocation, but also because the energy companies charged 
the costs of the allowances to the consumers, although they got these allowances for free. 
The outcome of the first trading period, therefore were high additional revenues for the fossil 
fuel industry, higher electricity prices for consumers, and next to no reduction in German 
CO2 emissions.107 This was partly corrected in the second trading period, when allowances 
were partly (10%) auctioned. 
 
3.3.4 Enforcement tasks 
 
a. Monitoring and Reporting Obligations 
The operator has to hand in the allowances equal to its emissions and the verified emissions 
report by March 31st of the following year (§ 5 TEHG), following the specific provisions of the 
Monitoring plan. In absence of specific provisions in the Monitoring plan, the EU Monitoring 
Regulation 601/2012/EU applies (Appendix 2, Part 2, TEHG).  
Operators of existing installations had to submit the Monitoring plan for the third trading 
period five months before the start of the trading period (Appendix 2, Part 1, §1(a) TEHG). 
For new installations, a Monitoring plan has to be submitted for approval before the start up 
of the installation (Appendix 2, Part 1, § 1(b) TEHG).108 The DEHSt can only grant approval 
of the Monitoring plan when it meets the requirements of the EU Monitoring Regulation 
601/2012/EU. If a submitted monitoring plan does not comply with the specifications of the 
Regulation, the operator is obliged to remedy the deficiencies noted within a period 
determined by the competent authority and to submit a revised monitoring plan (§ 6(2) 
TEHG). The operator is obliged to immediately adapt the existing Monitoring plan in case of 
changes in the EU Monitoring Regulation, changes in the GHG emissions permit, and other 
changes of the operator’s activities (§ 6(3) TEHG). In addition, the DEHSt has the power to 
make subsequent arrangements to ensure the fulfillment of the obligation to submit a 
Monitoring plan (§ 6(3) last sentence, TEHG).  
There is an ex-ante and ex-post control of the monitoring plan by DEHSt. The ex ante 
approval process is an elaborate process, which is largely done in an electronic way. The 
monitoring plan is an electronic file that is checked electronically with the DEHSt’s database, 
which has all data for each installation. The ex post control is an ongoing process, which 
involves a continuous measuring system (source streams), information on new emission 
sources, new scales, etc. New items for the monitoring plan are constantly added.  Updating 
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the monitoring plan for each installation is a constant process. As of 2014, site visits will also 
generate input for this process (see below). For ex post control the yearly emissions registry 
cycle is important as well, because here the annual emissions reports are checked against 
the monitoring plan by the verifiers.109 
In early 2014, DEHSt was checked by the European Court of Auditors, the EU’s independent 
external auditing body. The Court of Auditors performed a detailed check of how DEHSt did 
the monitoring during the 2nd trading phase.110 
 
b. Verification 
As of the adoption of Regulation 600/2012/EU, the rules for the accreditation of verifiers, 
more specifically the conditions for accreditation and withdrawal of accreditation, for mutual 
recognition and for peer evaluation of accreditation bodies , are completely harmonized, 
hence the TEHG simply refers to those rules (§ 21). It is stipulated that the verifiers are 
obliged to comply with Regulation 600/2012, and that they must fulfil their task strictly in the 
public interest (§21(2) and (3)). 
In Germany, there are 18 verifiers active. In addition, a handful of foreign verifiers (accredited 
in other countries) are active on the German market as well. There is one natural person as 
an accredited verifier (this option only exists recently). 
The DEHSt, checks the emission report after the verifiers did their work. The DEHSt does not 
double check the work of the verifiers, but, instead, does different checks than those done by 
the verifiers. They, for instance, compare different years and different source streams.111 
 
c. Inspection 
As stated above, enforcement tasks primarily rest with the DEHSt (Monitoring plan) and with 
the federal emissions authorities (GHG emissions permit for installations that fall under the 
BImSchG). Inspectors of these agencies have the power to (a) get access to installations, 
aircraft and places where installations and aircraft are, during business hours, (b) to carrying 
out tests, including the determination of emissions, during business hours and (c) to demand 
all information and documents that are needed to fulfill their tasks (§ 20 TEHG). Operators 
are obliged to inform and cooperate with the inspectors immediately. Failure to do so is a 
criminal offense (§ 20(3) TEHG and §55 Strafprozessordnung).  
Until 2013, the inspection was mainly an administrative process relying much on automated 
support: suspicious data are automatically reported (e.g., when the system finds big 
differences compared to previous years); these will then be checked in-depth. Data from 
various sources are compared and cross-checked. Until recently, DEHSt did not do physical 
inspections of installations. This was only done by the federal emissions authorities. They, 
however, did not focus on GHG emissions. Looking back, this was considered the biggest 
loophole in the German EU ETS compliance mechanism.112 As stated above, in 2013, it was 
decided to do site inspections together with the federal emissions authorities. The DEHSt is 
now (April 2014) in the process of setting up an inspection tool for its inspectors.  
 
d. Sanctions and cases 
Chapter 5 of the TEHG deals with sanctions. There, basically, are three types of sanctions: 
a) the automatic sanction stipulated in the EU ETS directive in case an insufficient number of 
allowances are handed in compared to the actual emissions, b) administrative sanctions for 
not complying to the rules of the TEHG and associated regulations, c) criminal sanctions for 
infringing either the TEHG and associated regulations, or provisions of the criminal code 
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(such as fraud). Under German law, these three pathways can all be pursued against a 
single operator.  
 
e. Administrative sanctions based on EU ETS Directive 
The EU ETS Directive stipulates that the excess emissions penalty is EUR 100 for each 
tonne of CO2 equivalent emitted for which the operator did not surrender allowances by April 
30th.113 This has been laid down in § 30(1) TEHG. This is an automatic fine for which there 
are no exemptions, except in case of force majeure (höhere Gewalt). The authorities can 
estimate the number of missing allowances. In addition to the fine, the missing allowances 
must still be handed in before January 31st of the next year (this is an obligation under the 
Directive). 
Another sanction which has to be imposed according to the Directive, is the publication of the 
names of the operators that did not surrender sufficient allowances (‘naming and shaming’ 
sanction, Article 16(2) of the EU ETS Directive).  As a consequence, DEHSt make 
information publicly available through the official journal. They do not publish the data on 
their own website, but there is a link on the website to the official journal. According to the 
DEHSt, NGOs do not follow up on this information (so far). NGOs do identify the dirtiest 
power companies from the reports, but they do not focus on compliance.114 
The DEHSt blocks access to the account of every installation for which insufficient 
allowances were surrendered. Each case in which insufficient or no allowances were 
surrendered, the imposing of sanctions is initiated.115 
Aircraft operators that do not comply with the requirements of the EU ETS Directive, in 
addition, can be sanctioned with an operating ban, be it only when various conditions have 
been met (Article 16 sections 5-11). These sanctions can only be imposed by the European 
Union upon request of the national authorities. In Germany, this sanction has been laid down 
in similar wording as the Directive, in § 31 TEHG. 
 
f. General administrative sanctions 
Infringement of almost all other obligations under the TEHG can lead to administrative fines 
under § 32 TEHG with a maximum of EUR 500.000 per individual infringement (note that 
with multiple infringements, the total fine for one company may rise to millions of euros)116. 
These are not automatic sanctions. For administrative offenses sanctions, the competent 
authorities have to show negligence.117    
 
h. Administrative sanctions in practice 
In the first year of emissions trading, 2005, DEHSt imposed administrative sanctions on 
operators in 180 cases. Numbers fell to 58 in 2006 and to 32 in 2007. In 2008, DEHSt took 
action only in 21 cases. For the year 2011, 17 installations had not rendered allowances.118  
According to the DEHSt, the rapid fall in the number of sanctions imposed shows that 
emissions trading procedures have become business routine. It is clear that there is a 
continuous decline of non-compliance. At the moment, there are an estimated 30 cases on 
non-compliance per year out of 1900 installations.119  
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Non-compliance, so far, has been detected in two ways. First and foremost by automated 
support: suspicious data are automatically reported (e.g., when the system finds big 
differences compared to previous years); these will then be checked in-depth. Secondly, by 
clever inspectors who compare data from various sources and do cross checks. It is 
expected that the newly planned site visits will further increase the detection rate of non-
compliance.120 When non-compliance is detected, DEHSt corrects the report, if necessary, 
and then the operator has to pay the sanction that follows from the corrected data. 
The total amount of sanctions imposed by DEHSt in the 2005-2011 period is around 20 
million EUR, of which (by Sept. 2012) only 3.2 million was actually received. The difference 
between what was imposed and what was actually received is caused by two factors: 
 
 Decisions to impose sanctions are always challenged before a court, in 100% of the 
cases.121 The competent authority has to wait until the final court decision before it 
actually can collect the money. At the moment (April 2014), an important preliminary case 
is pending before the Court of Justice of the EU, which was referred to the Court by the 
Bundesverwaltungsgericht, the highest administrative court in Germany.122  This case 
deals with the question whether DEHSt has to apply the sanction regime in case the 
amount of allowances is in accordance with the Verified Emissions Report, but when later 
it is discovered that more emissions actually took place, and the operator surrendered 
these additional allowances in the next year (so: are the sanctions to be based upon the 
verified emissions report or on actual emissions?).  Because of this preliminary case, 
other similar cases have put on hold. 
 Insolvency of companies in some instances (mostly smaller installations). 
 
i. Criminal sanctions 
In case infringements of the TEHG or associated regulations go hand in hand with the 
infringement of the criminal code, which for instance is the case when fraud is committed, 
criminal sanctions can be imposed as well. The VAT fraud hit Germany hard (in 2011, 
German prosecutors announced that the German state lost € 850 million in this scheme). In 
December 2011, a German court sentenced six people to jail terms of between three years 
and seven years and 10 months in a trial involving evasion of taxes on carbon permits. Many 
more criminal law suits are still ongoing as a consequence of the VAT fraud.123 
 
j. Conclusions on compliance rate 
As is shown by the above details about the number of sanctions imposed, there is a high 
compliance rate. According to the DEHSt, most operators want to be compliant. Non-
compliance usually is caused by negligence and by the complexity of the rules. It is also 
thought that the verifiers do a good job. They find a lot of mistakes that then are rectified, and 
hence are not observed by the DEHSt.124 In general, there is quality pressure within 
competent authorities in Germany. Operators know that DEHSt, as a consequence, is very 
thorough. In addition, sanctions in Germany are high.  
An important question that arises is whether the same conclusions can be drawn in case the 
carbon price is much higher than the current price of 3-4 EUR. It is assumed that the low 
price also is an important factor contributing to a high level of compliance. When asked, the 
DEHSt officials acknowledged that the higher the price, the more incentives exist to cheat the 
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system. That is why DEHSt is determined to further improve the monitoring and enforcement 
activities, especially through the introduction of site visits.  
 
3.3.5 Other compliance mechanisms: help desk for operators, collaboration across 
the EU 
 
In Germany, much effort is put in assisting companies to comply with the ETS. DEHSt has a 
busy helpdesk, regular mailings, they organize conferences etc., all aimed at helping 
installations to comply. Questions that they get with the helpdesk regularly lead to follow-up 
actions by the DEHSt.125 
Germany actively participates in the Forum on EU ETS Enforcement which has 4-5 task 
forces on various topics, one of which is on monitoring and reporting. Together with the 
Netherlands, Germany considers itself to be the main driver of the forum. DEHSt regrets that 
this is only a voluntary forum. There are only a handful of active members: Netherlands, 
Germany and UK, and to some extend Italy. With 28 MS, there are a lot of them not 
participating at all…126 In addition, DEHSt pointed at the Technical Working Group of the 
European Commission on all regulatory issues on climate change. Depending on the topic of 
the agenda, DEHSt participates in this as well (when monitoring and reporting regulations 
are discussed). Bilaterally, DEHSt has very good contacts with the Netherlands emissions 
authority Nea (regular meetings and exchange of information). 
 
3.3.6 Supervision by the Commission  
 
There have been no infringement procedures against Germany on the EU ETS.  
With the DEHSt officials, we discussed whether it is needed to further harmonize the 
monitoring and enforcement process at the EU level.127 They considered this a very 
important question and had just commissioned a research project on the question whether 
there should be a central EU emissions authority. According to the DEHSt, there seem to be 
advantages and disadvantages to such a central authority. A disadvantage, for instance, is 
the fact that such a central EU authority will probably have to operate in a quite bureaucratic 
way and cannot have the close contact to individual operators that decentralized authorities 
have. Generally, it is thought that a more personal approach increases compliance levels. 
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3.4  Case study: The Netherlands 
 
In the Netherlands there were two emissions trading systems, one for emissions of carbon 
dioxide (CO2) and one for emissions of nitrogen oxides (NOx). The latter has been ended by 
January 1st 2014.The main reason for this is the lack of ambitious long-term (international) 
NOx- commitments and other competing policy climate initiatives.  
According to the Dutch Allocation plan 2008-2012 349 installations fell within the scope of the 
Directive. In total these installations are responsible for almost 90% of the CO2 emission of 
the industry and energy sector.  
 
3.4.1 Legal implementation EU ETS 
 
The EU ETS legislation in primarily implemented in the Dutch Environment Management Act 
(‘Wet Milieubeheer’: Wm) A specific Chapter in this Act is dedicated to the EU ETS.128 In this 
chapter all elements of the ETS are arranged, such as the issuing of the GHG emissions 
permit, the monitoring and inspection by the Dutch Emission Authority, the national record, 
auctioning and international reporting. For specific elements there is the possibility and 
sometimes the obligation to establish an ordinance.129 
Every participant in the ETS has to obtain a GHG emissions permit before participating in the 
ETS. In the Netherlands the Dutch Emission Authority (Nederlandse Emissie Autoriteit, 
hereafter NEa) decides on the application for such a permit. The most important element of 
the permit is that the operator has to submit a monitoring plan that shows that the company 
will count and calculate her emissions accordingly.130 This requirement has to ascertain 
careful and reliable monitoring and enforcement of the EU ETS. Once the monitoring plan is 
approved and the permit is granted, the company has to submit a yearly report that has to be 
verified by an independent verifier. This report has to be submitted to the NEa before April 1st 
of the following year that has until to make its decision if the installation is complying with the 
norms.131 
The GHG emissions permit exists next to the general environmental permit for installations 
and companies. In theory, it would have been possible to integrate both permits and the 
requirements concerning monitoring and registration. However, the separation between the 
two permits has important advantages, for instance, when one of the permits shows a flaw. 
More importantly, in this way the competences to ensure the implementation of the ETS can 
be more easily concentrated at one expert competent authority.  
 
 
3.4.2 National competent authority 
 
The agency responsible for the functioning of the EU ETS is NEa. The Agency was set up in 
2005 by the Ministry of Housing, Spatial Planning and the Environment to be responsible for 
the compliance cycle of the EU ETS. From January 1st 2012 it has the statutory status of an 
independent authority (zelfstandig bestuursorgaan). As such, the agency falls under the 
central government, but is independent from the Minister. The Minister does however have 
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budgetary powers and every year the NEA submits a tender to the Minster containing a 
specific inspection strategy for the coming year. The Ministry of Infrastructure and 
Environment together with the Ministry for Economic Affairs, Agriculture and Innovation 
remain responsible for the development of the policy of the ETS, while the NEa is in charge 
of the implementation of the ETS. The NEa has the following tasks: 
 
- Issuing and actualization of the emission permit 
- Allocation of emission rights 
- Inspection and site-visits 
- Imposing sanctions 
- Supervision on the surrender of emission allowances 
- Supervision on compliance of regulations concerning bio-fossils.  
  
The NEa has 48 employees divided over four departments: First, Validation and Permits, 
responsible for the validation of the monitoring plan that is the backbone of the emission 
permit. Next, there is the department for Registration of Emission trading. This Department 
controls the Dutch part of the EU register on emission trading where transactions are 
conducted by accountholders. Third, the department Inspection and Enforcement. This 
department is concerned with the control and inspection of  operators participating in the EU 
ETS. If necessary, this department will take enforcement actions. Lastly, is the Management 
bureau dealing with finance, HR and Communication.  
Strikingly, all tasks regarding the functioning of the ETS are thus bundled within the NEA. 
This was a deliberate choice to enhance communication and quality throughout the 
compliance chain.  All employees however operate according to a functional division 
between departments to in order to account for checks and balances.  
 
Cooperation with different enforcement agencies 
The NEA cooperates when necessary with local police (in case of suspected fraud), the 
FIOD (tax authorities) or the ACM (Authority on Consumer and Market).  
 
3.4.3 National Allocation Plan  
 
The last National Allocation Plan (NAP) was for the period 2008-2012; for the third phase 
(2013-2020) the NAPs are abolished.  For this period a total of 77,2 Mton CO2 per year were 
allocated for free; the distribution of the allowances was specified in the national distribution 
decree (nationaal toewijzingsbesluit).132 In addition 16 million CO2 allowances were 
auctioned (revenue 180 million euro). In the third phase free allocation shall be gradually 
replaced by auctioning.133 From an enforcement perspective, this method of allocation is 
more transparent and efficient. The Netherlands participates together with 25 Member States 
in the ‘common auction platform’. Dutch allowances (EUAs) are auctioned there. The NEa 
has been appointed by the Ministry of Infrastructure and Environment to act as auctioneer. 
Since the NEA has no inspection powers regarding the functioning of the market it has to 
cooperate with the Authority Financial Markets (Autoriteit Financiële Markten). An example of 
this cooperation was the establishment of more transparent entrance conditions for market 
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players wishing to participate at the auctioning.134 The NEa issues an annual report on the 
auctioning in the Dutch context.135  
 
3.4.4 Enforcement Tasks 
 
a. Monitoring and Reporting Obligations 
As mentioned before, the monitoring plan is the central element of the GHG emissions 
permit. For the drafting of the monitoring plan an electronic template is provided by the NEa, 
as well as a standard application form for the emission permit. The monitoring plan has to 
conform to requirements of Regulation 601/2012 on the monitoring and reporting of 
greenhouse gas emissions and the Dutch decree Trade in Emission Allowances (Regeling 
handel in emissierechten). The drafting of the monitoring plan is considered to be a complex 
task taking on average approximately 2 months. This process is heavily guided by the NEa 
helpdesk. The NEa can only grant the permit once the monitoring plan satisfies the 
requirements of the Regulation, and thus checks every monitoring plan individually.136 The 
operator also has to submit data on uncertainties concerning measurements per source 
stream, on risk assessment and data on sampling.  
After the application for permit and the monitoring plan are submitted the NEa has to make a 
decision on granting the permit within four months. This validation process involves active 
correspondence between the applicant and the NEa, and usually means that at least once 
omissions have to be remedied. Once the monitoring plan is approved and the permits has 
been granted, there exists a continuously obligation for the operator to maintain the 
monitoring plan up-to-date if significant changes occur. This also means that there has to be 
constant oversight. For this purpose, the yearly emission reports that have to be verified and 
submitted to the NEA are extremely important.   
 
b. Verification 
The emission report has to be verified by an independent verifier. The verifier – in 
accordance with Regulation 600/2012 – takes the monitoring plan as a baseline to test the 
requirements and procedures laid down in the verification protocol.137 The emission report 
has to be approved and signed by the verifier before it is to be submitted to the NEA before 
31th of March of the following year.  In the Netherlands 7 verifiers are accredited the Dutch 
Council for Accreditation (Raad voor de Accreditatie). Not all verifiers are accredited to verify 
all industrial activities.  
The NEa does not test all emission reports to examine the requirements are met, but takes a 
random sample. If inaccuracies are detected the NEa will substitute the report by conducting 
its own measurements. There have been incidences where the NEa found omissions in the 
verified reports, and subsequently send a complaint to the verifier and the Council for 
Accreditation.138 
 
c. Inspection  
The NEa is solely responsible for the enforcement of the Dutch part of the ETS. Its main task 
is to control how the operator assesses its emissions, and how the relevant data is being 
processed and reported. For that purpose inspectors of the NEA have certain inspection 
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powers. First, it has access to all information related to the functioning of the ETS, and can in 
that regard demands all information and documents. Second, it can demand access to a 
installation in order to inspect for instance determination of emissions. Thirdly, it can conduct 
its own tests.  
The NEa has developed an Inspection strategy that is published on its website. All new 
entrants operating in the EU ETS shall be audited within three years to test their monitoring 
plan.  The frequency of audits for other operations depends on a risk based assessment, 
depending on the location and complexity of the operation, the amount of emissions, past 
compliance behavior and external signals.  In addition, random audits will be conducted. The 
audits are generally announced and the NEa provides a ‘what - to - expect’ list to help 
prepare operators for the audit. This exemplifies the strategy of persuasion of the NEA: 
throughout the whole compliance cycle the NEa deliberately communicates and assists 
operators in complying with the EU ETS.  
The standard audit involves an administrative investigation, but the investigation can also be 
extended to several days of testing measurements and financial administration. After a 
breach has been detected the NEa will re-visit the operator within a reasonable period of 
time.139 
 
d. Sanctions  
Key to the enforcement strategy of the NEa is – as mentioned above – compliance 
assistance rather than applying sanctions. If non-compliance is detected the NEa will first 
issue a warning and try to persuade the operator into compliant behavior. However, this is 
not possible for so-called core provisions.  For the following offences an administrative 
penalty will always be imposed: 
 
- Emitting without a permit; 
- Non-reporting of significant changes; 
- The lack of a continuous measurement system; 
- Not submitting the annual report; 
- Surrendering of insufficient allowances 
 
These are so-called essential obligations. If an installation has surrendered insufficient 
allowances, the NEa will impose the EU harmonized sanction of 100 euro per ton of 
allowances that were not covered.140 These penalties will be published including the name of 
the non-compliant operator in the Dutch official journal (‘naming and shaming’).141 Since this 
can be qualified as a punitive sanction, the requirements of art 6 of the European Convention 
on Human Rights (ECHR) have to be taken into account. The Dutch legislator has therefore 
chosen to only publish the name of the offender once there is no longer a possibility for 
appeal of the lump sum.  
In an Ordinance containing guidelines for determining the level of penalties, a distinction is 
made between ‘essential obligations’, ‘important obligations’ and ‘other obligations’.142 For 
each obligation the amount of the penalty is indicated. Infringements of obligations of 
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Chapter 16 of the Environmental Management Act can lead to a lump sum between 500 and 
450.000 euro; a penalty payment can amount to 4500 per day that the infringement 
continuous. Penalties are considered to be high. 143 
However, these are only guidelines. In practice, the NEa will only reach for these when a 
non-complying operator is very persistent. Thus, NEa takes seriousness of the infringement 
and past performance in to account when weighing the imposition of a sanction. It will first 
send a draft decision to which the addressed operator can respond. This response has to be 
taken into account by the NEA when reaching its final decision on sanctioning (appealable in 
court).  
In fact, not many sanctions have been imposed in Phase II (2008-2012). Between 2008-2011 
50 administrative penalties were imposed, with only 3 in the 2012 per 119 permits. In the 
same period 14 lump sums were imposed, again two in 2012.144 
The first obvious reason for this is the falling price of emissions; there is simply not an 
incentive for deviant behavior. However, according to the NEa it can also be attributed to the 
compliance assistance offered by the NEa. In fact, most of the non-compliance can be 
attributed to unfamiliarity with the legislation and the fact that the ETS is not part of the core 
business of operators. Most of the offences concerned the operation of a CO2 installation 
without holding the needed permit, breaching the deadline for submitting the emission report 
or not monitoring conform the monitoring plan.145  
The mandatory excess penalty has only been imposed three times in the past nine years; 
two of them were imposed in 2013. 
   
e. Registration Integrity 
Emission trading is vulnerable for fraud as evidenced in the past years, and registration 
integrity is particularly important in this regard. Since the 20th of June of 2012 an EU Register 
has been launched to ensure this integrity.146 The NEa is no longer responsible for technical 
maintenance, however has remained account manager of the Dutch part of the Register.147 
The NEa actively deploys a fraud prevention strategy that can be summarized as ‘know-your-
customer’: NEa periodically checks register holders, and reexamines again on the basis of 
the Registration Regulation.148 The NEa also applies the strict requirements of the 
Registration Regulation, such as the obligation to submit a declaration of (good) behavior 
before opening an account. In 2012, the NEa has decided several times to reject an 
application to register or to close an account on the basis of gathered information. 
In addition, the NEa cooperates closely with other enforcement agencies, such as the tax 
authorities or the Authority on Consumer and Market. Interestingly, there exists no market 
inspection yet.149 The NEa has previously indicated that they it does not possess specific 
expertise in the area of criminal market behavior.150  
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3.4.5 Other compliance mechanisms: help desk operators, collaborations 
across the EU 
 
The NEa has a very active helpdesk to ensure its ‘Compliance Assistance’ strategy. 98% of 
all questions are answered within 1,5 day. Interestingly, 50% of all questions are answered in 
English. In addition, much effort is afforded to different forms of information dissemination: 
the NEa Website is very transparent and accessible, there is a newsletter, information 
gatherings for ETS participants are organized, as well as a yearly NEa-day is organized.  
At the EU level, both the NEa and the Ministry of I&M are very active in the Compliance 
Forum. This Forum organizes ‘task forces’ on different themes (such as ‘Monitoring’) and 
‘best practices’ are being exchanged. The Compliance Forum meets once a year; the task 
forces more often. There exists huge differences between the different Member States and 
not many Member States are particularly active in this Forum. This could harm the level 
playing field that is needed throughout the EU to ensure an efficient and effective EU ETS.151 
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3.5  Case study: Greece 
 
Adopting the EU ETS along with a number of other environmental policies and measures 
reflects the effort of Greece towards combating Climate Change. Due to the severe 
economic recession in Europe and in Greece in particular, the interest in buying allowances 
has not been as strong lately. As a result there is an important accumulation of allowances 
that could lead to the ineffectiveness of the emissions trading mechanism.152 However, so far 
it has been shown that the Greek installations that are covered by the mechanism, 141 at the 
point of its initiation (2005-2007) and 160 today have complied at a very high rate.153 
 
3.5.1 Legal Implementation EU ETS 
 
In order to implement the obligations laid down in Directive 2003/87/EC, Greece elaborated 
the joint ministerial decision 54409/2632/2004.154 According to this decision the Competent 
Authority involved in the implementation of the EU ETS Directives in Greece is the Ministry of 
Environment, Physical Planning and Public Works, renamed to Ministry of Environment, 
Energy and Climate Change in October 2009 (YPEKA) and more specifically the Emissions 
Trading Office of the Ministry (GEDE). The ministers taking part in the decision were the 
Minister of Interior, Public Administration and Decentralization, the Minister of Economics 
and Finance, the Minister of Development and the Minister of Environment, Physical 
Planning and Public Works.155    
The scope156 of the decision applies to a number of activities.157 Activities include the ones 
related to energy (for example oil refineries), to production and processing of ferrous metals, 
to industry of inorganic materials and others such as industrial installations for the production 
of pulp out of wood or paper and cardboard that exceeds the 20 tons per day. There is an 
important clarification considering installations to which this decision does not apply. Such 
installations, or part of them, are the ones that are used for research, development and 
testing of new products and processes. The competent authority, i.e., the Minister of 
Environment, Physical Planning and Public Works, is responsible for the enforcement of this 
decision, as well as for the coordination between the co-competent Ministries and the public 
and private sector. He has to make sure the required measures are taken.  
For the realization of this coordinating responsibility, an Interministerial Commission is 
established. This Commission consists of seven members: three representatives from the 
Ministry of Environment, Physical Planning and Public works, two from the Ministry of 
Development and two from of the Ministry of Economics and Finance. 
This Interministerial Commission holds, among others, the following responsibilities:158 final 
elaboration of NAP after consulting with the operators, amendment of the NAP (in 
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consultation with the operators in the case that the EU commission declines it),advising the 
Minister of Environment, Physical Planning and Public Works in several issues related to this 
decision and, suggesting to the Minister of Environment, Physical planning and Public 
Works, legislative and administrative measures for the implementation of this decision. 
In the 25 Articles and five Annexes of joint ministerial decision 54409/2632/2004 are also 
provisions about the procedure that should be followed in order for the greenhouse gas 
emissions permit to be issued (content of the permit and conditions for granting it), provisions 
concerning the National Allocation Plan and its approval among with the method that should 
be followed in the allocation of allowances, provisions about the registries and other. Article 
10 stipulates the obligation for monitoring and reporting while in Article 11 it is mentioned that 
the reports should be verified. Both the decisions that approve the National Allocation Plans 
and the distribution of allowances and the reports that are required in order for the permits to 
be issued, should be accessible to the public. In the five Annexes, there are several 
clarifications about the different activities that fall under the scope of this decision, the criteria 
that should be followed concerning the NAPs and the principles according to which the 
monitoring, reporting and verification should take place. The Emissions Trading Office 
(GEDE) of the Department for the Control of Atmospheric Pollution and Noise of the Ministry 
of Environment, Physical Planning and Public Works, is established as the independent 
Competent Authority.  
To include aviation into the Greek ETS rules, Greece amended joint ministerial decision 
54409/2632/2004. Result of this amendment is the joint ministerial decision 
57495/2959/Ε103, published in December 2010.159 Since then, GEDE is also responsible for 
Aviation, together with the Hellenic Civil Aviation Authority of the Ministry of Infrastructure, 
Transport and Networks.160  
 
3.5.2 National Competent Authority 
 
As stated above, the national Competent Authority of Greece is the Ministry of Environment, 
Energy and Climate Change (YPEKA), and consequently GEDE, which is part of the General 
Direction of the Environment of YPEKA, established within the Department for the Control of 
Atmospheric Pollution and Noise.161 GEDE, among others, during the first two trading periods 
of the mechanism prepared the National Allocation Plans (NAPs), modified them and notified 
the Commission for the changes in the case that a NAP was declined. GEDE also published 
the NAP, taking in consideration the public comments during the preparation until the final 
approval.162 In addition, it recommends the Minister of Environment about the allocation of 
allowances or the temporary exception of some installations, the imposition of sanctions and, 
generally, about other legislative or administrative measures for the implementation of the 
joint ministerial decision by the competent authority. GEDE is also responsible for monitoring 
and reporting every transaction, as well as every return or cancellation of allowances. 
Furthermore, it is responsible for the annual reports and for making sure that the public will 
get the required access to information. It also used to collaborate with the National Center of 
Environment and Sustainable Development for the preparation of the national registry. Each 
year, operators have to report their emissions to the Competent Authority. The same goes for 
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every change in their installation.163 The personnel of GEDE comes either from YPEKA or 
from other public sector bodies. 
As indicated above, during the second phase of the EU ETS, in December 2010, joint 
ministerial decision 57495/2959/Ε103 was published, which included the aviation sector. In 
the case of aviation, GEDE has to collaborate with the Hellenic Civil Aviation Authority 
(H.C.A.A.), which falls under the responsibility of the Ministry of Transport and 
Communication. Some of the responsibilities undertaken by the H.C.A.A. are the control and 
approval of the monitoring plans and the submission to the Competent Authority of an annual 
report concerning aircraft operators (issue of new permits, renewal or recall of old ones). The 
number of employees in GEDE has always been very low. Including the aviation sector, four 
people plus a superior, are currently employed.164 The workload is very big since GEDE is 
not only responsible for the EU ETS but also for the rest of the climate change sector.165 
The greenhouse gas permit is issued by the Minister of YPEKA after a request/proposal from 
GEDE. In practice the issuance of the permit due to the workload of the Minister can also be 
signed by the General Secretary of this Direction of YPEKA.166 For the issue of a greenhouse 
permit, the operator of the installation shall submit an application to GEDE. Then, after a 
proposal by GEDE, the permit is granted by the Minister of YPEKA. The operators shall keep 
GEDE updated for any changes. In addition GEDE should submit a copy of the permit to the 
Ministry of Development and YPEKA. 
During the first trading period (2005-2007), 141 industrial installations were included in the 
EU ETS in Greece. These installations were granted temporary permits that would be valid 
until the approval of the NAP for the period 2005-2007.167 
 
3.5.3 National Allocation Plan 
 
GEDE, during the first two periods of the mechanism ,after collecting all the necessary data 
and information, prepared the National Allocation Plans and handed them in to the 
interministerial commission for final elaboration. Then, the commission  in order to complete 
the NAP proceeded to a consultation with the private and public operators that are involved 
in its implementation and then  suggested its approval to the Minister of Environment, 
Physical Planning and Public Works. Once the NAP was approved, GEDE published it and 
notified the European Commission and the Member States. The publication in the daily press 
included also notification that the public could address to GEDE and get information 
concerning the NAP. The NAP was approved by a joint ministerial decision made by the 
Ministers of Environment, Physical Planning and Public Works and Minister of Development. 
The NAP that Greece prepared for the period 2005-2007 was approved by the Commission. 
As a result, it was adopted by the ministerial decision 36028/1604/2006.168 
For the phase II, the NAP that Greece submitted initially was not approved by the 
Commission due to an insufficient compliance to specific requirements. More specifically, 
some of the arguments of the Commission were the following: 1) The allowances allocated 
were more than needed in order for the mechanism to function in Greece; 2) the procedure 
under which the allowances were allocated was not clear enough, especially when it came to 
new entrants; 3) Greece did not follow the principle according to which any adjustments of 
the allowances allocated should be done before the adoption of the NAP and in no case after 
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its approval.169 Furthermore, the quantity of allowances allocated to the industrial installations 
of Greece exceeded the needed ones by 21.6 million, while the value of this surplus is 
estimated to be 335.000.000 Euros. Also, for the period 2008-2011 the 87% of the total 
surplus was allocated in only ten installations.170 Greece had to proceed to an amendment of 
the NAP which finally led to its approval and to its adoption by the ministerial decision 
52115/2970/E103/2008. 
 
3.5.4 Enforcement Tasks 
 
a. Monitoring and Reporting Obligations  
According to the Annual Reports submitted by Greece, the Community Decision 
2007/589/EC is applied to monitoring and reporting. In addition to this Decision, as 
mentioned in the Annual Report 2009,171 two clarifying Ministerial Circulars were sent to the 
verifiers and operators.172 The operators are obliged to monitor the greenhouse gas 
emissions of their installations and submit a report to GEDE (Joint ministerial decision, Article 
10). Providing that the reports have been verified, the operators are obliged to hand them in 
to GEDE before the 31st of March each year.173 
In Greece it is a common practice that most of the operators send the verified report to 
GEDE on the last day.174 This is quite problematic because everything then has to be 
checked within a very short period. But in the end, operators, after being pressured by 
GEDE, hand in what is needed also because of the verifiers.175 In 2008, one installation with 
emissions below 50 Kt per year did not submit a verified report because of technical and 
financial difficulties until 31 March 2009.176 As mentioned in the Annual Report, the 
competent authority was informed by the installation about this delay and eventually the 
report was submitted in April leading to the surrender of the allowances on April 30 of the 
same year. In the Annual Report of Greece of the year 2009 towards accomplishing an 
improvement on the monitoring and reporting, the Competent Authority, after the examination 
of the verified reports, sent a letter to some installations giving them some more clarifications 
and at the same time asking for some more information.177 In the 2007 Annual Report178 it is 
mentioned that reports were not submitted for the 31 installations of the DEI179 due to a strike 
of the employees during March 2008, a period in which many of the installations were 
occupied. The reports were eventually submitted on 15 April 2008.Three other operators with 
annual emissions under 50kt did not submit verified reports on time either due to severe 
technical and financial issues.  
 
b. Verification 
The operator is obliged to assign the verification of the report to an independent verifier. The 
verifiers had to meet the minimum requirements derived from the ministerial decision 
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3354/2001.180 In Greece there are five accredited verifiers at the moment.181 In the case that 
the report gets approved by the verifier, it has to be submitted to GEDE before 31 March of 
each year, otherwise the operator has not the right of transferring allowances until the 
submission of a verified report. 
The verifier shall be in any case independent from the operator and shall be very well 
informed about both the legislation and the operation of the particular installation.182 The 
Hellenic Accreditation System (ESYD) is an agency responsible for checking the verifiers.183 
It is not a recently established agency but the last years the legislation has changed and as a 
result this agency has been playing a more active role in the control of the verifiers. 184 The 
verifiers visit the installations to make sure that everything that has been reported is accurate 
(site visits). A representative of ESYD has also the right to join these site visits, but we could 
not ascertain that they actually made use of this right. From the period 2013-2020 the 
verifiers are obliged to notify ESYD and the Competent Authority on their schedule of site 
visits. ESYD can choose to join them in these site visits as part of the verification process.185 
The permit of verifiers is issued by the Ministry of Development. GEDE cannot accept a 
verified report from a verifier that does not have a permit issued by the Ministry of 
Development and has not been accredited by ESYD. There is a procedure that has to be 
followed which consists of the following steps. The verifier (to be) goes to ESYD and gets a 
certificate of accreditation. Then the verifier submits this certificate to the Ministry of 
Development along with the other documents that are required for the issue of the permit. 
The Ministry of Development notifies the Competent Authority of this permit and ESYD also 
notifies the Competent Authority of the companies that it has accredited as verifiers. 
ESYD has sent an Excel sheet with details on the companies that have been accredited by 
them to the Competent Authority. Since 2013, once the Competent Authority gets the verified 
reports, it is obliged to also evaluate and grade the verifier in detail.186 The verifier visits the 
installations, checks all the bills and verifies if the data that the operator submitted were 
accurate. Then, GEDE is obliged to check these data. Not every report is being checked: 
there are randomly controls of some of the reports.187 It has happened sometimes that the 
GEDE finds small mistakes that needed to be checked.188 
 
c. Inspection 
The legislation provides GEDE with the ability to perform site visits to the installations but so 
far such thing has not happened.189 The low number of employees (four), the time and the 
funding are not sufficient. This in combination with the high number of operators (160 
installations and 15 air companies) has made site visits very difficult.190 
 
d. Sanctions  
If the operators do not comply with this present decision, administrative, criminal and civil 
sanctions will be imposed.191 Every operator that does not surrender sufficient allowances in 
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order to cover the emissions of the last year, until the 30th of April of each year, has to pay a 
fine of 100 euro per ton of emissions equivalent to CO2. Despite the payment of the fine, the 
operator still has to surrender allowances equal to the excessive admissions the following 
year. For the first phase, starting January 1st 2005 (2005-2007), a smaller fine should be 
imposed. For the excessive admissions the fine was 40 euro per ton of emissions, with the 
obligation to surrender equal allowances the following year. 
In addition, every individual that fails to comply with the rest of the provisions of this decision, 
by act or omission, is obliged to pay a fine between 1500 and 3000 euro and temporarily 
close down the installation for a period from 5 to 20 days. During the present period the 
administrative sanctions (fines) are still at the same level (1500-3000euro). They can be 
imposed to the operators through the Tax Office (public economic service/Δ.Ο.Υ.)192 
If an installation has problems and does not comply or does not hand in the required 
documents, a fine should be imposed. GEDE is responsible for recommending the fine 
imposition to its superiors in YPEKA. At first, though, GEDE notifies the operator and invites 
them for an interview. There the operator is being asked to comply and also explain why 
such compliance has not taken place already. If the installation insists on not complying after 
the interview GEDE turns to YPEKA as mentioned. 
 
For the year 2013 there were only two incidents of non-compliance.193 
 
According to the Annual Report of Greece (2007) the method of naming and shaming is 
possible through the joint ministerial decision that implemented Directive 87/2003. However, 
in Greece this method has not been used so far. These cases are not published by the 
competent authority itself, but they are available online194.  
 
3.5.5 Other compliance mechanisms: help desks for operators, collaboration 
across EU 
 
During the last two years, one conference has been held by GEDE (as part of YPEKA) for 
which all the installations were invited to get informed on the EU ETS, with the main focus on 
the upcoming changes from 2013.195 Another conference was held by a verifier in which 
GEDE made a presentation and answered questions of the operators. In addition, the 
operators can reach GEDE by telephone (which, according to the interviewee at GEDE, they 
do constantly) in order to get more information, although GEDE does not seem to have a 
dedicated help desk for operators. The opening hours are the ones that apply generally to 
the Greek public sector (approximately 8.00 am to 16.00 pm).196 The webpage is currently 
being updated. At the moment, the webpage only has the legal texts of the EU Directives and 
Regulations, the joint ministerial decision which implemented the EU ETS in Greece and the 
ones that implemented the approved NAPs. No specific guidance documents are provided 
here for participants in the EU ETS. In addition the National Allocation Table for the period 
2013-2020 is available along with directions on the procedure that have to be followed for the 
issuance of the greenhouse gas permit, information about new entrants and guides on the 
structure of the annual emissions reports that the operators have to submit.197 In the English 
version of the webpage there is less information. Concerning the level of collaboration 
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between the EU Member States: Greece does not participate in the EU ETS Compliance 
Forum. Sometimes officials from GEDE participate in conferences and meetings that are 
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3.6 Case study: Poland 
 
It was only after 1989 that policy makers in Poland started to focus on environmental and 
climate change issues. 198 Until Poland’s EU accession on 1 May 2004, Polish policy and law 
on climate change were shaped by the goals of the United Nations Framework Convention 
on Climate Change (UNFCCC)199 and to its Kyoto Protocol.200 One of the main obligations 
resulting from ratification of the Kyoto Protocol by Poland was to reduce the greenhouse gas 
emissions by 6% in 2008˗2012 in relation to the base year which was chosen as 1988 
according to Article 4.6 of the UNFCCC and Decision 9/CP.2. Poland succeeded in fulfilling 
its obligations under the UNFCCC and the Kyoto Protocol. 201 According to Poland’s Fifth 
National Communication under the UNFCCC, ‘an efficient system of emission permits, 
thermal modernization, penalties and fees, and the financing of emissions reduction and new 
low- carbon technologies from environmental protection funds, have largely contributed to 
the achievement by Poland of a reduction of about 30 per cent in greenhouse gas emissions 
compared to the base year 1988.202 Karski even highlights that, ‘thanks to instruments 
provided for in domestic environmental law and energy law, significantly better results have 
been achieved than in case of most other countries that have reduction commitments under 
the Kyoto Protocol’. 203  
 
However, Karski also underlines that ‘the role of the socio-economic transformation, which 
resulted in the collapse of a broad spectrum of highly polluting enterprises and a growing 
importance of environmental values, cannot be underestimated here.’204 Also the recent 
Sandbag report Sharing the load – Poland’s coming of age on climate policy mentions the 
fact that ‘the transition to a market economy has seen a dramatic decoupling of growth from 
emissions. Since 1988205 Poland’s emissions have fallen by 31% and the carbon intensity of 
the economy has fallen by 90%.’206 Nonetheless, the report strongly emphasizes that Poland 
remains the fourth largest emitter in the EU28, with CO2e emissions of 387 million in 2012 
and is also the 10th largest EU emitter on a per capita basis, emitting 10 tonnes per person in 
2012, and criticizes the fact that ‘despite its sizeable emissions, the carbon budgets set for 
Poland under the Climate and Energy Package for 2013-2020 are, on average, 3% higher 
than its current emissions levels.’ Poland was granted these carbon concessions in 
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acknowledgement of the special challenges it has faced in its transition from Communism to 
a market economy.207  
 
The Sandbag report concludes that ‘as Poland’s economy matures it should be weaning 
itself off special concessions208 and taking on more climate responsibilities, not shirking 
them, and certainly not holding back the wider European effort.’ The report subsequently 
points out that ‘despite all of the special arrangements that have been put in place to assist 
Poland in the transition to a lower carbon economy, Poland has been steadfast in resisting 
efforts to agree new climate targets after 2020, vetoing council conclusions on both the Low 
Carbon Roadmap and the Energy Roadmap to 2050, and warning that they will veto a 2030 
climate target if leaders attempt to agree one in the European Council this March.’209 
 
3.6.1  Legal implementation of EU ETS  
 
Compared to Poland’s successful fulfilment of its UNFCCC and Kyoto obligations, the 
situation of the implementation of EU law and policy210 looks different. According to arski this 
area of Polish law ‘is characterized by weak links between its instruments’. 211 He gives the 
following background to this development  
  
 ‘When the process of negotiation on Poland’s accession to the EU was initiated and continued, the 
EU acquis in the area of climate issues had not yet been developed. The significant reduction of 
greenhouse gas emissions seemed to leave Poland some leeway in the implementation of EU tasks. 
When going through the transformation, Poland had not focused adequately on creating an impulse to 
modernize the economy. A rude surprise came in the form of the consequences of Directive 
2003/87/EC of October 2003. (…).The EC directive of 2003 was implemented by the Act of 22 
December 2004 [see further below]
212
, however, the EU ETS did not begin to function in Poland until 
the summer of 2006. This was due largely to the lack of adjustment of the system provided for in 
directive 2003/87/EC to the accession of Member States which had already reduced their emissions.’
 
213  
Since Poland became member of the EU as of 1 May 2004 and as mentioned, the EU ETS 
system did not begin to function in Poland until the summer of 2006, his case study of the 
enforcement of EU ETS in Poland will focus on the end of the First Phase (2005-2007) and 
the Second Phase (2008-2012) linked to the implementation of the initial directive governing 
the ETS system, Directive 2003/87/EC of 13 October 2003 and the first amending Directive 
2004/101/EC of 27 October 2004 establishing a scheme for greenhouse gas emission 
allowance trading within the Community in respect of the Kyoto Protocol’s project 
mechanisms.  
 
Subsequently, this case study will discuss some aspects of the (legal) preparation for the 
Third Phase (2013-2020) as set out Directive 2008/101/EC of 19 November 2008, amending 
Directive 2003/87/EC so as to include aviation activities in the scheme for GHG emission 
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allowance trading within the Community, and Directive 2009/29/EC of 23 April 2009 
amending the Directive 2003/87/EC so as to improve and extend the GHG allowance trading 
scheme of the Community.  
 
The emission trading system in Poland is based on several Acts and Ordinances. The legal 
basis for the ETS system in Poland was established by the Act of 22 December 2004 on 
trade of allowances to emit greenhouse gases (GHG) and other substances to the air 
(hereinafter: ‘’Emission Trading Act’’ or “ETA’’)214 that implemented Directive 2003/87/ EC. 
The subsequent Act of 17 July 2009 on the management of emissions of GHG and other 
substances (hereinafter: “Emission Management Act” or “EMA”)215 focuses on monitoring 
and management of the Kyoto units, thus implementing Directive 2004/101/EC. The most 
recent act, amending the two previous acts, is the Act on the emission trading system of 28th 
of April 2011 (hereinafter: ETS Act)216 aims to implement Directive 2008/101/EC and 
Directive 2009/29/EC. The amendments to national law were made to facilitate the 
implementation and approval of projects (e.g. renewable energy sources, Joint 
Implementation projects) for the reduction of greenhouse gas emissions from installations 
covered by the EU ETS.  
 
The Polish Emission Trading Act (ETA) 217. 
The Emission Trading Act established the general framework for the Polish emission trading 
system218 and provided for the necessary procedures and the administrative structure to 
make emission trading operational in Poland. 219 It regulates its scope220, the permit 
procedure221, the procedure for issuing allowances222, the design of a national emission 
trading registry223 , the tasks of the National Administrator of the ETS (‘’NAETS’’ or 
‘’KASHUE’’)224, as well as provisions on the transfer of allowances and compliance 
instruments225.The ETA system includes two sub-systems: 1) a community emission trading 
system and 2) a national emission trading system.226 The system covers GHGs227 and other 
substances228. The community emission trading system covers GHGs. The national emission 
trading system covers the emission of ‘other substances’ into the air. A detailed list of the 
types of installations that have to be included in the system and their respective thresholds 
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are set out in the Ordinance of the Minister of the Environment of 27 July 2009 on the types 
of installations covered by the Community emission allowance trading.229 
  
The Emission Management Act of 17 July 2009 (EMA) 230 
The Act of 17 July 2009 on the management of emissions of GHG and other substances 
(Hereafter: “Emission Management Act” or “EMA”)231 transposes regulations of the so called 
Linking Directive (2004/101/EC). This Act sets forth the responsibilities of the National Centre 
for Emission Balancing and Management (KOBIZE)232 and the principles of the operation of 
the National System for Emission Balancing and Forecasting. Further, it regulates the 
principles of the management of emissions of greenhouse gases and other substances; the 
principles of the operation of the National Registry of the Kyoto Units and emission allowance 
and the principles of trading in and managing the Kyoto units. It also provides the legal 
framework for the operation of the National Green Investment Scheme and the Climate 
Account and of the management of the Joint Implementation projects and Clean 
Development Mechanism projects in the territory of the Republic of Poland.233 The list of 
greenhouse gases and other substances released into the air and covered by the system for 
the management of emissions of greenhouse gases and other substances is set out in the 
Annex to this Act.234 
 
Act on the Emission Trading System of 28th of April 2011 (ETS Act).235  
The ETS Act on the emission trading system of 28 April 2011 entered into force on 21 June 
2011 and replaces the law of 22 December 2004 on the Polish Emission Trading Act (ETA). 
It regulates the functioning of the of the ETS scheme in the current trading period (2008-
2013) – which in many important aspects differs from the rules that will be binding as from 
2013. The Act relates only in certain provisions to the trading period 2013-2020. 236 The ETS 
Act encompasses the emission of GHG from: 1) installations carrying out an activity causing 
emission if the installations meet the capacity thresholds 2) aircraft operations which begin or 
and at the territory of the EU Member State. 237  
 
The law implements provision relating to 1) qualification of the installations to be covered by 
the schema238 2) inclusion into the ETS scheme of aircraft operation performed by the aircraft 
operator239 3) rules for disposing of emission allowances240 4) rules for auctions241 (relating to 
the second trading period) 5) the system for effective sanctions safeguarding the 
performance of the obligations imposed by the law.242  
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As regards the contribution of the ETS Act to the functioning of ETS in Poland, Jaś 
concluded the following: “the ETS Act combines provisions of the Phase II with the provisions 
of the Phase III. As a matter of fact, the implementation of provisions of the Directive 2009/29 
and other provisions of the Community law relating to the functioning of the ETS into the 
Polish legal system by the Act of 28 April 2011 is work in progress.243 The issues to be 
regulated include the terms of purchase of missing allowances at auctions, rules for 
allocation of free allowances (under Articles 10(a) and 10(c) of the Directive 2009/29/EC) and 
the way of spending funds received from the sale of emission allowances. Much as these 
changes to the Act are absolutely necessary, it seems hardly possible that this will be done 
before the end of the second accounting period. It can be expected that it will rather be the 
period of the creative interpretation of the law and the close cooperation between the 
national administration and the government in terms of negotiating the scope of application 
and enforcement of the provisions of law.”244 Stoczkiewicz is even more critical about the 
current ETS Act. He points particularly at the lack of transposition of Article 10(a), 10(c) and 
3 (h) of Directive 2009/29/EC and the fact that “due to these deficiencies in transposition, 
Polish legislation does not exclude the possibility of free allowances for new entrants, i.e. 
installations that have obtained their first greenhouse gas emissions permit after 30 June 
2011245”. In fact, the Polish legislator forgot to transpose and implement the principles 
concerning auctioning and, instead, only took care of the exceptions to this principle.246 
Stoczkiewicz therefore concludes that “this partial and faulty transposition has a significant 
impact on the implementation of the amended Directive 2003/87/EC and jeopardizes the 
achievement of the Directive’s objectives”.247 
It can be concluded that, whereas directive 2003/87 has been transposed correctly in Polish 
law248, so far, (April 2014) Poland did not adopt any legal act that would fully transpose 
Directive 2003/87/EC as amended by Directive 2009/29/EC. As Poland did not transpose 
Directive 2009/29/EC on time, on 31 January 2013 the European Commission sent to the 
Polish authorities a formal notice, based on Article 258 of the Treaty on the Functioning of 
the European Union.249 
The Polish government is currently preparing a draft act on the greenhouse gas emission 
allowance trading scheme. 250 
 
3.6.2  National competent authorities  
 
Poland is a regionalised unitary state, with 3 levels of sub-national government: 16 
voivodeships (województwo - regions); 314 powiaty (powiat - upper tier local government - 
                                               
243
 See for a very critical analysis of this Act by M. Stoczkiewicz: Black Paper. Implementation of EU 
Climate and Energy Law in Poland, 2012, pp. 12-19. http://www.clientearth.org/reports/061113-
climate-and-energy-black-paper.pdf 
244
 M. Jaś, ‘Greenhouse gas emission allowance trading scheme in the Polish law’, Polish yearbook of 
Environmental law, No, 2 (2012), p. 117.  
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counties); 2,478 municipalities (gmina, upper tier/ lower tier).251 Due to the complexity of the 
administrative system and of the environmental regulations in Poland, different administrative 
authorities of the national and sub-national/regional level are involved in the process of EU 
ETS enforcement:  
 
 Ministry of Environment – main supervisor of the system, responsible for law 
implementation/transposition;  
 KOBIZE – central Competent Authority (registry, allocation, annual emission reports); 
 Network of regional administration institutions (assessment and issuance of permits 
and accepting of monitoring plans); 
 Chief Inspectorate of Environmental Protection (GIOŚ) and sixteen Voivodship 
(Regional) 252 Inspectorates for Environmental Protection (WIOŚ) (irregular situations, 
financial fines, etc; 
 Polish Centre for Accreditation (PCA) – supervision of verifiers accreditation 
process;253 
 
National Centre for Emissions Management (KOBIZE) 
The EMA of 17 July 2009 established the National Centre for Emissions Management 
(hereinafter: ‘National Centre’ or ‘KOBIZE’)254 which took over the tasks of the National 
Administrator of Emissions Trading System (KASHUE) established under the 
abovementioned ETA of 22 December 2004.255  
The responsibilities of the National Centre for Emissions Management (KOBIZE) ,256 as 
established in Article 3 EMA, concern a range of different tasks relating to the operation of 
the National System for Emission Balancing and Forecasting, including the keeping of the 
National Database on Emissions of Greenhouse Gases and Other Substances257, keeping 
the National Registry of the Kyoto Unit and keeping the list of the Joint Implementation 
projects, and drawing up sets of information and reports, in particular for the purposes of the 
public statistics.  
As regards the administration of the greenhouse gas emission allowance trading scheme, 
KOBIZE in particular has the following tasks: 
 
a) keeping the electronic database containing information about installations subject 
to the scheme necessary for the development of the draft national greenhouse gas 
allocation plan (…); 
 b) keeping the electronic database containing information about aircraft operators (…) 
c) providing opinions on monitoring plans, referred to in Article 51(1) of the Act of 28 
April 2011 on the  greenhouse gas emission allowance trading scheme; 
 d) collecting data and performing analyses on the scheme; 
e) developing of the draft national greenhouse gas allocation plan for the installations 
subject to the scheme; 
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f) compiling reports on the scheme in terms of participation in the system of 
installations and aircraft operators; 
 g) providing explanations, preparing information and training materials; 
h) cooperation with public administration authorities and fulfilment of international 
commitments;  
i) keeping the list of the entities authorised to verify the reports specified in the Act of 
28 April 2011 on the greenhouse gas emission allowance trading scheme prepared 
by the aircraft operators and installation operators; 
 j) conducting emission allowance; 
 k) providing opinions on draft legal acts and documents concerning the scheme; 
l) drawing up lists of the installation operators and aircraft operators who infringed 
their obligations related to the participation in the scheme, and forwarding them to the 
Minister responsible for the environment. 
 KOBIZE also keeps the list of the entities authorised to verify the reports. 
 
 
According to article 4 EMA, the performance of duties of the National Centre is a 
responsibility of the Institute for Environmental Protection in Warsaw. It is a research institute 
supervised by the Minister of the Environment under the provisions of Chapter 7 of the Act of 
30 April 2010 on Research Institutes.258 The Minister responsible for the environment 
supervises the performance of its responsibilities by the National Centre. 259 By 31 January of 
each year, the National Centre submits a report on the performance of its responsibilities to 
the Minister. 260 Where the report is incomplete or gives rise to objections, the Minister may 
request that the report should be supplemented or additional clarification should be 
provided.261 If by the set date the National Centre fails to supplement the report or to submit 
the clarification required, or if the report submitted still gives rise to objections, the Minister 
may order to carry out an inspection in the scope of the tasks performed by the National 
Centre. 262If any significant irregularities are found in the scope of the performance of its 
responsibilities by the National Centre, the Minister may dismiss the Director of the Institute 
of Environmental Protection.263  
 
3.6.3  National Allocation Plans 
 
National allocation plans (NAPs) determined - during the period 2008-2012264 - for each 
Member State the ‘cap’ or limit on the total amount of CO2 that installations covered by the 
EU ETS can emit, and set out how allowances will be allocated to individual installations. In 
Poland the procedure for the drawing up the NAP was follows: The national Centre prepared 
a draft of the National Allocation Plan265. After public consultations266 the National Centre 
forwarded the draft of a national plan to the Minister of the Environment. The Minister 
consulted the project with the Council of Ministers and subsequently the national plan was 
presented to the European Commission and the Member States. The Commission assessed 
the Member States’ proposed NAPs against the 12 allocation criteria listed in the Directives. 
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The National plans had to be consistent with the EU’s and Member States’ Kyoto 
commitments, with the actual verified emission levels reported in the Commission’s annual 
progress reports and with the technological potential to reduce emissions. Article 13(1) of the 
ETS Act determines what issues should be regulated in the national allocation plans. 267  
 The acceptance of the Polish NAPs by the European Commission was beset by long 
procedural disputes, including proceedings before the Court of First Instance of the 
European Community.268 According to Karski: this ‘bad experience with the community 
trading system negatively influenced the reception of this extremely interesting market-based 
instrument by generating general reluctance towards climate issues. The consequence has 
been a destabilization of the EU ETS and thus of this part of emission reduction law in 
Poland. Emission trading is associated with constant changes, low predictability and unclear 
rules.’269 
 
3.6.4  Enforcement tasks 
 
a. Monitoring and Reporting Obligations  
GHG emissions permit 
Entities using installations covered by the system are obliged to obtain a permit for emissions 
of greenhouse gases270 from the relevant authority at the level of sub-national government. 
The body competent for issuing permits to take part in the trading scheme is the starost 
[powiat or county governor], or in the case of plants incorporating an installation which 
qualifies as an undertaking likely to have a significant impact on the environment 
environmental impact, and in respect of which the compilation (submission) of a report on the 
undertaking’s environmental impact is compulsory - the competent marshal of the 
voivodship. 271 As mentioned, there are 16 voivedeships and 314 (380) powiats (counties) in 
Poland. Permits are granted for a maximum period of 10 years.272  
The permit is one of the tools that helps supervise the system, but it is up to an independent 
decision of each regional administration institution if they conduct inspection during the 
process of issuing the permit.273 The starost [powiat or: county governor] and the marshal of 
the voivodship are supervised by the Ministry of Environment and are not directly linked to, or 
accountable to, the monitoring and compliance system of the National Center (KOBIZE) and 
the Regional Inspectorates for Environmental Protection (Wojewódzki Inspektor Ochrony 
Środowiska).  
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This structure makes the control on the issuance of GHG permits rather weak as became 
clear in e.g. the case of the Łęczna coal plant near the Ukrainian border.274 In this case 
permits were issued for the coal plant worth of €33-million of free allowances. Under EU 
rules, exemptions from the ETS until 2020 – ‘10 c derogations’ - can only be granted to 
power plants if their investment process was ‘physically initiated’ before 31 December 2008, 
and if their greenhouse gas permits were issued before 30 June 2011. However until this 
date (1 May 2014) there is no visible evidence that any construction work has begun.275  
 
Under article 3(16) of the ETS Act, a permit is an administrative decision allowing for 
emission of greenhouse gases from an installation covered by the system and defining duties 
of an entity using the installation as regards control. 276 The lack of such a permit means that 
using an installation in the area of emission of greenhouse gases covered by the system 
during the accounting period is not permitted. Where the entity using the installation does not 
possess a permit a penalty of 50.000 Euro can be imposed.277 So far, this has never 
happened.  
 
The monitoring plan 
According to article 56 of the ETS Act, an entity using an installation covered by the system 
is obliged to draw up an emission monitoring plan. The monitoring plan goes through both 
ex-ante and ex-post control. Ex-ante control is conducted by regional administration 
institutions [see under Permits]during the process of acceptance and issuing of a monitoring 
plan.278 Ex-post control of a monitoring plan and all related monitoring procedures is 
performed annually by verifiers during the verification process in accordance with Art 16,17 
and 27 of ETS Act [see under Verifiers].279 The entity using an installation is bound to change 
the plan280, inter alia, in the case the monitoring methodology applied has changed or 
contains mistakes.281  
 
 Monitoring plan for air operations 
Directive 2008/101/EC of 19 November 2008 amended Directive 2003/87/EC so as to 
include aviation activities in the scheme for greenhouse gas emission allowance trading 
within the Community. This incorporation of aviation emissions in the EU ETS is one of the 
major developments in the EU ETS Phase III. Consequently, one of the new aspects in the 
ETS Act is the regulation of the functioning of the scheme of aircraft operations performed by 
aircraft operators. 
 
The ETS Act introduces separate regulations for control plan for air operations. The control 
plan prepared by an aircraft operator consists of set of information about the manner of 
running the register and data gathering for preparation of the annual report on CO2 
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emissions and balance of tonne- kilometre in a given accounting year.282 The aircraft 
operator is obliged to prepare two separate control plans: the emission amount control plan 
and control plan for the amount of tonne-kilometres made during the air operations.283  
 
The acceptance of a monitoring plan drawn up by an aircraft operator differs from the 
acceptance of the installation emission monitoring plans. An aircraft operator is obliged to 
issue a motion for the acceptance of the plan by the Minister of the Environment.284 The 
Minister hands over control plans to the National Centre for the purpose of checking their 
consistency with the Commission’s decision 2009/29/EC.285 Subsequently the National 
Centre informs the Minister of the compliance of the plans within 14 days from receiving such 




Every year, before 31 March, entities managing installations and aircraft operators have the 
obligation to submit288 to the National Centre a verified report on the amount of GHG 
emission. The assessment by the National Centre includes an evaluation of completeness, 
correctness of calculation, compliance with MRR requirements and monitoring methodology 
approved in a monitoring plan.289 The National Centre contacts the entity or operator for 
further explanations where it finds any irregularities. It can also require adjustments to be 
made in the report within 30 days.290 If the deadline of 31 March is not met, the National 
Centre blocks the operator’s or entity’s account in the National Registry. 291  
 
In case of detection of non-compliance (lack of emission report, emission report submitted 
after the deadline, lack of surrendered allowances in registry, number of surrendered 
allowances is smaller than annual emission) 292 the National Centre draws up a list of these 
cases and forwards it to the Regional Inspectorates for Environmental Protection293 by 15 
May, and to the Minister of Environment. The latter publishes the list in the Public Information 
Journal. (Biuletyn Informacji Publicznej)294  
 
Non-compliance may finally lead to the imposition, by the Regional Inspectorates for 
Environmental Protection, of financial fines of up to 10.000 Euro - an amount considered to 
have a deterrent effect.295 Where the National Centre has not been notified in due time of the 
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fact that an installation has stopped to fulfil the requirement of the system, a penalty of 5000 
Euro can be imposed. 296 So far, this has never occurred.  
  
b. Verification 
The institution responsible for accreditation of verifiers in Poland is the Polish Centre for 
Accreditation (a member of European Co-operation for Accreditation). Currently 8 companies 
are accredited by PCA as verifiers. In addition there is a number of verifiers accredited by 
national accreditation bodies in other Member States that provide their services in Poland. 
The website of the the National Centre contains a register of accredited verifiers.297 
Articles 59-62 ETS Act (42-48 ETA for First and Second Phase) set out general requirements 
regarding the verification of the annual report and accreditation of the auditors.298 Entities 
using installations and aircraft operators pay the costs of the verification of the reports.299  
 
Remarkably, all annual reports submitted between 2007 until 2012 to the National Centre, 
have received positive feedback from the verification.300 Moreover, in the years 2008-2012, a 
special team by the National Centre carried out an analysis of the correctness of the 
calculation and checked compliance between annual emission reports and monitoring 
requirements included in permits for participation in the EU ETS (the methods of monitoring 
and reporting).301 During these years no situations were reported where the National Centre 
had to instruct the registry administrator to correct the annual verified emissions for the 
previous year for any installation(s) to ensure compliance with the detailed requirements 
established by the Member State pursuant to Annex V to Directive 2003/87/EC.302 
The National Centre confirms that the non-compliance level is very low in Poland and adds 
that cases of non- compliance are usually related to meeting the deadline for the submission 
of annual emission reports. This is often due to the fact that there are not enough accredited 
verifiers on the market.303 
 
c. Inspection  
As mentioned above,  where the National Centre detects cases of non-compliance (lack of 
emission report, emission report submitted after the deadline, lack of surrendered allowances 
in registry, number of surrendered allowances is smaller that annual emission)304 it  draws up 
a list and forwards it to the relevant Regional Inspectorate for Environmental Protection305. for 
further factual control.306 On the basis of this information the Regional Inspectorates for 
Environmental Protection plan and conduct their inspection activities. Inspection is 
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considered ‘a useful tool that could be used in more problematic cases (like lack of an 
emission report in case of cessation, bankruptcy, closures etc). However, due to high cost 
and capacity limitations it is up to an individual decision of each institution when and how to 
organize the inspection.’307   
 
If the Regional Inspectorate for Environmental Protection finds any irregularities affecting the 
determination of the amount GHG emitted he determines the factual amount of the emission 
and notifies the National Centre.308 The excess emissions penalty is 100 Euro for each tone 
of CO2 equivalent emitted for which the operator did not surrender allowances by 30 April.309 
So far, no penalties have been imposed.   
 
d. Sanctions  
The system for effective sanctions safeguarding the performance of the obligations imposed 
by the law is regulated in chapter 8 (Articles 51-67 ETS Act) on Monitoring and Balancing 
and in Chapter 11 (Articles 70-77 ETS Act) on financial sanctions of the ETS Act. In general 
possible sanctions are the following: blockade of an account in the registry (in case of lack of 
the report at the end of March); inspection and estimation of annual emission by a regional 
competent authority (in case of lack of the report or serious misstatements); financial fines (in 
case of lack of the permit, lack of the annual report or when insufficient number of 
allowances were surrendered); publication of company’s name in official journal (“name and 
shame”).310  
 
As mentioned above, the National Centre assesses the data and figures presented in the 
annual report and contacts the entity or operator for further explanations where it finds any 
irregularities. It can also require adjustments to be made in the report within 30 days.311 The 
total number of permits that were updated during the reporting period because of a change in 
the nature or functioning, or extension, of installations made by operators as specified in 
Article 7 of Directive 2003/87/EC was in 2007: 347, in 2008: 317, in 2009: 841, in 2010: 286, 
in 2011: 405, in 2012: 985. 312  
 
If the deadline of 31 March is not met, the National Centre blocks the operator’s or entity’s 
account in the National Registry. 313 The total number of allowances in the accounts blocked 
in 2009 was: 13 661 412 allowances for 55 of installations. In 2010: 4 476 835 for 34 of 
installations. In 2011: 1 651 925 Mg CO2 allowances for 18 of installations. In 2012: 92 472 
Mg CO2 + 3000 ERUs for three314 installations.315 
 
The National Centre also draws up a list of entities managing installations and aircraft 
operators who did not submit a report in due time and forwards these lists to the Regional 
                                               
307
 Questionnaire KOBIZE, received 7 May 2014. 
308
 Art. 63 (5) and (6) ETS Act.  
309




 Art. 62 (4), (5), (6), (7) ETS Act. 
312
 Art. 21 reports’ by Poland for the years 2007 – 2012. See: http://cdr.eionet.europa.eu/ 
313
 Art. 62 (1) and (3) ETS Act.  
314
 In 2012 KOBIZE blocked 3 accounts in the registry as a sanction for incompliance. Some other 
accounts were temporary blocked for missing the deadline for submission of the annual emission 
report or when some mistakes were found in the emission report during the assessment in KOBIZE. 
Those accounts were later unblocked when the annual emission reports were submitted or when the 
corrected versions of the annual emission reports were provided. Source: Questionnaire KOBIZE, 
received 7 May 2014.  
315








308481_ENTRACTE_D2.4_Report of the Legal Implementation of the EU ETS at Member State Level 66 
Inspectorates for Environmental Protection316 and to the Minister of Environment. The latter 
publishes the list in the Public Information Journal (Biuletyn Informacji Publicznej).317 
 
Financial penalties 
Financial penalties are imposed by a Regional Inspectorate for Environmental Protection as 
executive orders. As of 2011 the fines have increased considerably. Regional Inspectorates 
for Environmental Protection are authorised to impose penalties in situations mentioned in 
Articles 70-72 ETS Act: A penalty of 10.000 euro for failure to submit a verified report on 
emissions in due time (Article 70 (1))318; A penalty of 5.000 euro for the omission to notify 
changes to the installation ( Article 70 (2))319; A penalty of 50.000 euro for running an 
installation without permit (Article 72 (1)) 320; An excess emissions penalty of 100 Euro for 
each tone of CO2 equivalent emitted for which the operator did not surrender allowances by 
30 April (Article 71) 321. 
 
Before 15 February, the Regional Inspectorates for Environmental Protection inform the 
National Centre and the National Funds about the amounts imposed by way of penalty; the 
names of the users of the installation or the airplane operators, and the type of infringement. 
322 With regard to penalties for airplane operators, abovementioned information is also 
forwarded to the Minister of Environment. 323  
There is a high compliance rate in Poland. According to the National Centre, the financial 
fines are quite high so operators try to do everything on time. In addition to that the National 
Centre sends reminders before each important deadline.324 Between 2007 and 2012 no 
penalties were imposed pursuant to Article 16(1). 325  
 
3.6.5  Other compliance mechanisms: help desks for operators, collaboration across 
EU 
Permanent assistance is available in Poland for companies that have questions regarding 
their obligations under the EU ETS. KOBIZE as a central Competent Authority provides help 
for both companies covered by EU ETS and other institutions. Those support activities 
include: 
 Helpdesk (including allocation, MRV, registry, legal);  
 Annual workshops for verifiers (together with PCA); 
 Dedicated workshops (introduction of new MRV requirements or templates); 
 Preparation of guidlines, templates and examples or translation of EU level support 
documentations.  
 
Further, representatives of Ministry of Environment or KOBIZE are participating actively in all 
official Technical Working Groups (benchmarking, monitoring & reporting, accreditation & 
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verification, aviation) and many additional forums like Compliance Forum task forces (TF 
MR, TF AV, TF Aviation). In addition a KOBIZE representative is a Member of the 
Compliance Forum Steering Committee.326 
 
As regards the legal implementation of the EU-ETS system in Polish law and policy it can be 
concluded that the transposition in Polish law of Directive 2003/87, including the 
establishment of several institutions for the monitoring and compliance of the EU- ETS, has 
occurred correctly,327 but that Poland has not yet328 managed to not adopt any legal act fully 
transposing Directive 2009/29/EC. Whereas this partial and faulty transposition of this 
Directive hampers the realization of the Third Phase of the EU-ETS in Poland, it does not 
directly affect the functioning of the Polish EU-ETS monitoring and compliance system and 
institutions as such.  
 Further, with regard to the EU-ETS monitoring and compliance system in Poland, it 
can be concluded that the control over permit issuance is a weak point in the system. One of 
the reason might be the deficient connection between the ex-ante monitoring and compliance 
conducted by regional administrative authorities which issue permits for GHG emission and 
the ex-post monitoring and compliance by the National Centre and the Regional 
Inspectorates for Environmental Protection.  
 Finally, the fact that between 2007 and 2012 no fines were imposed at all,329 can 
probably be attributed to the deterrent effect of the high fines for the different infringements; 
to the fact that operators and entities have ample opportunity to update their permits; and to 
the fact that the National Centre sends reminders before each important deadline and 
regularly blocks the account of an operator or entity in the National Registry. 
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3.7   Case Study: United Kingdom 
 
The UK has been a forerunner in emission trading. Between 1999 and 2002, in a period of 
widespread optimism and faith in the efficacy of new economic policy instruments, the UK 
Emissions Trading Scheme (UK ETS) was created.  This scheme was a voluntary, scheme 
covering six greenhouse gases, measured in equivalence to carbon dioxide (CO2e). On 
average, each of the 33 direct participants in the UK scheme made a commitment to reduce 
their emissions by roughly 12% from their 1998–2000 baselines, creating an aggregate 
reduction of 12 million tonnes of CO2e from 2002 to 2006 under the emissions cap.330The 
scheme began in 2002 and finished quietly in 2007, at which time eligible participants moved 
into the EU emission trading scheme. 
 
Currently around 1000 UK installations participate in the EU ETS. These include power 
stations, oil refineries, offshore platforms and industries that produce iron and steel, cement 
and lime, paper, glass, ceramics and chemicals. Sectors covered by the EU ETS, will 
account for over 50% of the emissions reductions needed to meet UK targets between 2013 
and 2020. The EU ETS plays a key part in ensuring that the UK complies with its legally 
binding carbon budgets, which have to reduce UK emissions to at least 35% (below 1990 
levels) in 2020. For the UK the total verified EU ETS emissions in 2012 was 
231.2MtCO2.The average annual Phase II cap for the UK is 245.6MtCO2. The actual 
allocation to UK installations covered by the EU ETS in 2012 was 229.0MtCO2.331 Overall, 
the UK’s ambition to combat climate change is very high aiming at a reduction of 80% by 
2050. For that purpose, it has drafted the Climate Change Act 2008.332  
 
3.7.1  Legal Implementation EU ETS 
 
Directive 2003/87EC is implemented in the UK by The Greenhouse Gas Emissions Trading 
Scheme Regulations 2012 (hereafter ‘The Regulations’) and came into force on 1st January 
2013 replacing a previous sets of regulations and their amending instruments.333 
Significantly, enforcement and sanctions policy has been changed and has become more 
lenient in the Regulations 2012. Some additional changes were proposed in 2012 and public 
consultation was held on these proposals.334   
The Regulations require all operators that carry out an activity covered by the EU ETS to 
hold a GHG emissions permit - in effect, a licence to operate and emit greenhouse gases 
covered by the EU ETS.335  IPPC regulators have to check whether ETS permit is necessary 
and inform ETS regulators. The inclusion of the aviation sector in the EU ETS is particularly 
relevant for the UK since as a leading aviation hub 409 airlines fall under UK jurisdiction, out 
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of the 1191 registered in the EU. The Regulations have implemented all legal obligations 
stated in Directive 2003/87EC, such as authorisation for changes in the installation type or 
operating mode required, authorisation for changes in the monitoring methodology required, 
Authorisation for changes in the monitoring methodology required, notifications of changes 
and closures and penalty in case of non compliance with request to update monitoring 
methodology. 
  
3.7.2  National competent authority 
 
It is important to note that the Regulations extend to the whole of the United Kingdom. 
However, greenhouse gas emissions trading is a devolved matter in Scotland, a transferred 
matter in Northern Ireland, and in Wales is an area where the Welsh Ministers exercise a 
wide range of executive functions.336 The Regulations accordingly provide for distinct 
“regulators” or “authorities” in relation to those different parts of the United Kingdom. The 
“regulator” may be the Environment Agency, the Scottish Environment Protection Agency, or 
the chief inspector in Northern Ireland; and the corresponding “authority” will be the 
Secretary of State or the Welsh Ministers, the Scottish Ministers, or the Department of the 
Environment in Northern Ireland. In the case of certain offshore installations, including those 
on the United Kingdom Continental Shelf, the Secretary of State is the regulator as well as 
the authority. 
 
Policy responsibility for the EU ETS and the National Emissions Inventory lies with 
Department of Energy and Climate Change (DECC) (although policy for aviation emissions is 
shared with the Department for Transport (DfT)), together with the Northern Ireland 
Executive, the Scottish Government, and the Welsh Government. 
 
The operator of an installation can apply to the regulator for a greenhouse gas emissions 
permit to carry out a regulated activity at the installation. The regulator for England and 
Wales is the Environment Agency, for Scotland the Scottish Environment Protection Agency 
(SEPA), for Northern Ireland, Northern Ireland Environment Agency (NIEA), Natural 
Resources Wales, the Department of Energy & Climate Change (DECC) for offshore 
installations. The national administrator for the UK is the Environment Agency, and is 
responsible for managing the accounts under the jurisdiction of the UK within the Union 
Registry. The EU ETS regulators are responsible for: enforcing compliance with the EU ETS 
Regulations, including operational functions such as granting and maintaining permits and 
emissions plans (for aviation), monitoring and reporting (including monitoring plans), 
assessing verified emission reports (and tonne-kilometre reports), determining reductions in 
allocations as a result of changes in capacity or cessation of activities, Receiving and 
supervising verified emission reports and exchanging of information with UKAS on verifier 
activities. Hence, most tasks regarding the functioning of the EU ETS are bundled in one 
Agency.The Environment has approximately 25 employees; NIEA and SEPA has a lot less 
staff. Every month a conference between the different regulators to exchange information 
and assistance is held. When needed the regulator exchanges information with other 
regulators, such as the police and market authorities.  
 
3.7.3  National Allocation Plan 
 
Since in Phase III centralized allocation of permits replaces the NAPs, the emphasis will be 
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on the greater share of auctioning of permits. The UK has submitted - in accordance with 
Article 11 of the revised ETS Directive 2009/29/EC - to the European Commission the UK’s 
National Implementation Measures (NIMs), consisting of the free allocation of allowances to 
installations under Phase III of the EU Emissions Trading System (2013-2020).337 
Subsequently, the UK has made a small number of modifications to its NIMs as a response 
to the Commission’s questions regarding the preliminary NIMs. This included the introduction 
of preliminary levels of free allocation for four additional installations and amendments to the 
preliminary free allocation levels of seven installations that were included in the original NIMs 
submission.  
 
3.7.4  Enforcement tasks 
 
In England & Wales particular attention has been dedicated to the principles underlying its 
enforcement strategies.338 The principles that reflect the approach in enforcement are: 
proportionality, consistency, transparency and the targeting of actions are the key underlying 
principles of enforcement. Considering these principles it is not surprising that cost-
effectiveness is taken into account when the regulator applies its enforcement strategy.  
 
a. Monitoring and reporting obligations 
When the operator applies for a GHG emissions permit it must satisfy the regulator that at 
the time that the permit is granted the applicant is capable of monitoring and reporting 
emissions from the installation in accordance with the monitoring and reporting requirements, 
otherwise the permit must be refused.339 Operators have to complete a monitoring and 
reporting plan template (monitoring plan), based on the Commission’s Guideline 
requirements.340 This is then submitted to the competent authority for approval. Already at an 
early stage the regulator is actively involved in providing the needed information and 
assistance. The monitoring plan then becomes part of the installation’s GHG permit 
conditions and therefore is a legally binding requirement upon the operator. Significant 
variations to the monitoring plan are likely to also require a permit change and have to be 
approved by the regulator.341 
Interestingly, The UK has developed and installed an online Emissions Trading System 
Workflow Automation Program (ETSWAP). All monitoring plans and reports are to be 
submitted in a standardised electronic format. This online system is capable of checking 
anomalies relative to previous entries.342 The online system may even refuse certain 
information that is to far of the values of previous years. There is hence ex-ante and ex-post 
control of the monitoring plan. The ex-ante process is an elaborate process, where the 
monitoring plan is scrutinized and that can be best qualified as a dialogue between the 
operator and the regulator.343 In this process regulators can for instance amend the 
monitoring methodology. There is a permit condition requiring compliance with the monitoring 
                                               
337
 Modified UK National Implementation Measures for Phase III of the EU Emissions Trading System 
as submitted to the European Commission in April 2012 following the first stage of their scrutiny 




 Environment Agency, Enforcement and sanctions statement Policy 1335_10 (previously 
EAS/8001/1/1), Version 2. 
339
 Regulations, 10(2)(b). 
340
 The template was originally developed by the UK.  
341
 Regulations, 12. 
342
 Interview Environment Agency, 7 April 2014. 
343








308481_ENTRACTE_D2.4_Report of the Legal Implementation of the EU ETS at Member State Level 72 
methodology and it is an offence to fail to comply with permit conditions.344 Concerning the 
ex-post control the regulator must review a permit before the end of the period of five years 
beginning with the date on which the permit was granted, and afterwards at intervals not 
exceeding five years.345 Each year by 31 March the report of annual reportable emissions 
must be submitted to the regulator, relating to emissions arising during the previous calendar 
year. The report must be in accordance with the relevant provisions of the Monitoring and 
Reporting Regulation, and will be checked by the regulator. 
 
b. Verification 
The annual emission report must be verified in accordance with Regulation 600/2012 on 
Verification declaring that (a) in preparing the report, the operator has complied with the 
relevant provisions of the Monitoring and Reporting Regulation, (b) the operator has 
complied with the monitoring plan for the installation and (c) the report is free from material 
misstatement.346 In the UK 9 verifiers are accreditiated by the United Kingdom Accreditation 
Service (UKAS). During 2013, re-assessed all UK verifiers. In addition, a couple of verifiers 
that have been accreditiated in other Member States are active in the UK. The UKAS 
regularly performs surveillance on verifiers to ensure they are meeting their accreditation 
obligations and conforming with Government guidance on annual verification. If the regulator 
finds that the verifier is not performing well this is reported to UKAS. 
In the verified reports information on non-material non-conformities or non-material 
misstatements is included.347 Non-material misstatement and non-conformities are 
subsequently addressed in improvement reports by operators that are required to be 
submitted to the competent authority by 30th June each year.348  
If operators do not provide an emission report by 31 March of the reporting period a formal 
warning letter is sent to operators, this has however not been followed by any sanction if the 
reports were received at a later time. If the report is late or missing the regulator determines 
the Reportable Emissions; other times the late verified data are used.349 
The regulator carries out independent checks on all verified reports; comments of this 
assessment are made and send back to the operator. Certain reports are selected for 
detailed analysis; this is done on the basis of classification of an installation in one of 
categories laid down in Reg. No 601/2012.350 All Category C installations regardless of on 
their status after verification are subject to detailed analysis. In addition, since 2012 a 
selection of category A and B installations that were verified were subject to checks on the 




According to Regulation 46 an authority, the Secretary of State, the registry administrator or 
a regulator can, by notice served on any person, require that person to furnish such 
information as is specified in the notice, in such form and within such period following service 
of the notice or at such time as is so specified. In 2012 50% of the reports were subject to 
detailed analysis by the regulator, and were checked on their internal consistency.352 
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The regulator regularly undertakes site visits; 5% of the operators are audited each year. 
These audits are announced since the purpose of these visits is more to check than to 
inspect, although formally the regulator could use its power of entry.353 regulators in England 
and Wales have developed a common format for reporting the results of site visits.354 The 
results of the site visits are submitted into an electronic database into which the details of the 
site visit are entered. The details include a summary of the visit, any non-compliance 
identified and any subsequent actions that have been agreed with the operator.  It is also 
considered whether the findings of the site visit to need to be communicated to another body. 
Improvements are noted with the operator and vary permits if necessary. Non-compliance is 
explicitly recorded in order to create a database of historical performance for future 
reference. Follow-up gradually intensifies from a phone call or a visit to slightly more invasive 




As mentioned in Chapter 1, the Directive 2003/87EC requires Member States to put in place 
a system of penalties which is effective, proportionate and dissuasive but the nature of the 
penalties is largely left to Member State discretion (with the exception of the penalty for 
failure to surrender sufficient allowances in certain circumstances). The Regulations set out 
the penalties to which a person is liable if they do not comply.355   
Notably, for Phase III, DECC have changed its policy on penalties substantially by moving 
from a mixture of civil and criminal penalties to a scheme based entirely on civil penalties.356 
The reasoning was that proportionality would improve greater compliance by widening the 
scope of regulator discretion over the imposition of penalties and levels imposed, to align 
penalties for installations and aviation as far as possible and to ensure that the penalties are 
sufficiently dissuasive to ensure high levels of compliance.357 
Hence from January 2013 onwards the following amendments were introduced: 
 
- A €20tCO2 penalty if an Operator initially failed to surrender the correct emissions,  
but advised the regulator of their mistake and surrendered the correct allowances 
before the regulator noted their non-compliance;358 
- Regulator discretion in imposing some penalties;359 
- Removed criminal penalties from EU Emissions Trading Scheme transgressions 
 
The idea behind the first amendment was that operators are given the opportunity to self-
rectify under-reporting of emissions in previous years since imposing the penalty in cases of 
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self-rectification was seen as disproportionate. It was envisaged that operators that have not 
already been sent a penalty notice, and that self-report a shortfall in the verified emissions 
report and surrender the required amount of allowances are not liable to the 100tCO2 
penalty.  
The UK Government is arguing is that this amendment is still within the aim of Directive 
2003/87/EC to ensure that all relevant emissions of greenhouse gases are monitored and 
reported, and accounted for by means of the surrender of allowances. Therefore the lower 
penalty only applies to underreporting and not to under surrendering. However it has also 
been suggested that operators can deliberately leave reportable emissions out of their 
reporting obligation thereby using this possibility to benefit from a lower penalty.360  
 
It is certainly questionable whether the mandatory penalty of Article 16(3) Directive 
2003/87/EC is a discretionary penalty. The UK Government was well aware of the legal risk it 
took by including this new provision when is stated that ‘the legal position may in the longer 
term have to be clarified by the UK courts’.361 Considering the ruling of the Court of Justice in 
Case C-203/12 it seems that this question has now been answered. As discussed earlier the 
Court interpreted the question as whether Article 16(3) and (4) of Directive 2003/87 must be 
interpreted as meaning that it may be varied by a national court on the basis of the principle 
of proportionality. The Court clearly denied such a role for the principle of proportionality.362  
 
The discretion given to the regulator is such that they can (a) refrain from imposing a penalty, 
(b) reduce the amount of a penalty, (c) extend the time for payment of the penalty, (d) 
withdraw a penalty or (e) modify a civil penalty notice by substituting a lower penalty. It still 
has to be clarified what the discretion exactly entails, but a detailed guidance of this is in the 
make.363  
The discretion however does not apply to the mandatory penalty for failure to surrender 
sufficient allowances in certain circumstances.364 In the last incidence, the regulator must 
publish the name of the person on whom that penalty was imposed. This must be done as 
soon as possible after the expiry of the period for appealing the imposition of a penalty by the 
regulator under regulation 54(1), or if such an appeal is made, the determination or 
withdrawal of the appeal.365 Once the regulator is satisfied that a person is liable to a civil 
penalty the regulator must serve a notice of this on Person.366 
The Regulations further specify what penalties under what conditions can be imposed.367 For 
the purpose of calculating civil penalties, DECC determines the value of the EU ETS carbon 
price used by the regulator. In February 2013, the Secretary of State issued a Ministerial 
Direction to instruct regulators on how the penalty for operating without a permit should be 
calculated.368 The Direction includes a transparent methodology for estimating the economic 
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benefits from operating without a permit. Regulators are also required to apply a 5% increase 
to ensure the penalty is above such benefits and the desired deterrent effect is produced.  
In reality, not many penalties have been imposed in the UK. In fact, between 2008-2011 no 
civil penalties were imposed pursuant to Article 16(1) of the ET Directive.369 In the same 
period a total of 21 excess emission penalties were imposed during the reporting period 
pursuant to Article 16(3) of the ET Directive.370In England and Wales fines amounted to a 
total around £2 million across nine operators. All these penalties were the result of reporting 
mistakes according to the Environment Agency.371  
Some additional amendments have been proposed by DECC: 
 
- Clarify the level of civil penalties to be imposed on operators carrying out 
unauthorised EU ETS activities and the discretion available to regulators to waive or 
reduce such penalties; 
- Bring the penalty for under-reporting EU ETS emissions prior to 2013 into line with 
the penalty from 2013, enabling regulators to impose a lower level of civil penalty, or 
even waive a penalty entirely, where operators self-report and surrender the requisite 
number of allowances; 
- Replace the National Emissions Inventory’s system of criminal sanctions with a civil 
penalty scheme and remove the associated powers of entry (not relevant for ETS). 
  
On these amendments a public consultation was held.372 Taking these responses into 
account DECC decided to lay the legislation before the Houses of Parliament.373 It remains to 
be seen if they will be deemed ‘effective, proportionate and dissuasive’.  
 
3.7.5  Other compliance mechanisms: help desk for operators, collaboration across 
the EU 
 
The regulator is very active in providing assistance through its helpdesk, in particular for 
small emitters. In addition it has published an extensive Compliance manual to assist 
operators in complying with the EU ETS that is accessible on the Internet. There is also 
guidance available on its website to assist in the permit application process. DECC and the 
regulators are actively notifying stakeholders of the new procedures that will are being 
introduced through email, newsletters, stakeholder workshops and updating respective 
websites where appropriate. The regulator also participates inbusiness-led Emission Trading 
Group (ETG) a forum for discussion of all aspects of emissions trading that enables 
communication to take place between commerce and industry, and the UK Government. This 
forum is particularly active in the formative stage of policy development. 
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At the EU level, both DECC and the regulators are active in the Compliance Forum. This is 
regarded as most valuable to test thoughts, exchange best practices and frequently asked 
questions. The UK participates in several task forces and has the lead in the task force on 
Aviation. For instance it has ‘exported’ its advanced online Emissions Trading System 
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3.8 Case Study: Hungary 
As Hungary joined the European Union in 2004 it also had to adopt and implement the EU’s 
legislation governing the newly set up EU ETS. In this first introductory phase a new 
legislative framework was established in order to build the framework for the functioning of 
the EU ETS system. More generally, Hungary’ s re-defined National Energy Strategy set the 
goals and tools for reduction of carbon intensity by generation of nuclear power, using 
renewables in cogeneration plants and shutting down old, inefficient capacities. The new 
targets are set in the Renewable Action Plan where the proportion of usage of renewables in 
various sectors is set at 14,65% reached by 2020.374 Based on the National Climate Change 
Strategy 2008-2025375 (Nemzeti Éghajlatváltozási Stratégia) the greenhouse gas emission 
target is 16-25% below the 1990 level by 2025. Currently 234 installations participate in the 
EU ETS with an average total annual allowances of 30,733,313 during the second trading 
period.376   
 
3.8.1 Legal Implementation EU ETS 
 
In Hungary, a large number of legal steps had to be taken to implement the EU ETS 
Directive and to set up the system (an implementing Act and executive Ordinances, 
Government and Ministerial Ordinances). The core Act XV of 2005377 on the Greenhouse 
Gas Trading System established the legal basis for emissions trading in Hungary. It defined 
the scope of emissions trading for activities listed in Annex 1, with the exclusion of research 
and development and testing new products and technologies. As for their legal nature, the 
allowances belong to transferable exclusive rights of the Hungarian State Treasury. 
Furthermore, it set the rules for monitoring, reporting and verification, the guidelines for the 
government for the establishment of the National Allocation Plan, defined the requirements 
for issuing a GHG permit, regulated the acquisition, banking and surrendering of allowances, 
rules on compliance, on the Registry, sanctions (punitive fees and other sanctions), the 
obligation of the Government for reporting to the Commission and it introduced a fee for the 
operators to cover the supervisory tasks of the Inspectorate.  
 
A range of subsequent Government and Ministerial Ordinances were issued to further detail 
the rules of the Act. These included the National Allocation Plan and National Allocation List 
for the period 2005-2007,378 Government Ordinance 213/2006379 and its subsequent 
changes, the National Allocation Plan and National Allocation List for the period 2008-
2012,380 Ordinances on the verification process and on verifiers and subsequent changes,381 
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an Ordinance on administration fees,382 an Ordinance on supervisory fees,383 and an 
Ordinance aimed at integrating the aviation sector into the ETS.384 
For the implementation of the changes in EU ETS in the third trading period a new Act on the 
EU ETS and burden-sharing385 and its Execution Ordinance386 were adopted. Since the 
verification was harmonised, new rules for the accreditation of verifying institutions were 
adopted,387 and the Rules on Fees were revised and substituted with new legislation.388  
 
In Hungary, a separate (single) permit is necessary for the installations to carry out their 
activities based on Articles 3 (1)(2) and 4 (1)(2) of the Act on EU ETS and burden-sharing 
which is due to be requested within one year of the beginning of its activities. There is no 
coordination between the GHG permit and the permit required by Industrial Emissions 
Directive 2010/75/EU.  
The monitoring plan is one of the documents that need to be attached to the request along 
with other documents listed in Annex 1 of the Execution Government Ordinance.  
 
3.8.2 National competent authority  
 
In phase I the competences in EU ETS were shared between three ministries: the Ministry of 
Environment and Water Protection was responsible for the National Allocation Plan and the 
supervision of the system, the Ministry of Economy and Transport determined the maximum 
emissions per sector, and the Ministry of Finance was dealing with auctioning. 389 Fazekas 
pointed out that the division of competences led to discrepancies within the ministries due to 
their different priorities.390 The Ministry of Environment prioritized reduction of emissions as 
for the Ministry of Economy took part in bilateral negotiations with representatives of 
companies of the iron, steel and petrochemical sectors.  
 
Currently only 4-5 employees are working at the national competent authority (hereafter: the 
Inspectorate). This National Inspectorate is responsible for the complete compliance cycle: 
from granting the GHG permits to imposing fines and penalties. This also includes the 
integrity of the Register. A member of the Hungarian Parliament has questioned the 
operation and daily work of the Inspectorate.391 
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3.8.3 National Allocation Plan 
 
Through the transposition of Article 11 (1)(3)(4) of Directive 2003/87/EC, Government 
Ordinance 66/2006 contained the National Allocation Plan and the National Allocation List.392 
In the National Allocation Plan II for Phase II 30,733,313 tCO2/year were allocated to 
installations for free in average, and in Hungary 5% of the allowances were to be 
auctioned.393 In the second phase, 24,166,474 tCO2/year were allocated to existing 
installations. For new entrants, 2,193,902 tCO2/year were reserved free of charge and 
548,476 tCO2/year could be allocated for charge, altogether 26,908,852 tCO2/year. The 
aggregated sum of the allowances during the second trading period without the separated 
allowances for joint implementation projects was 134,544,260 tCO2. 
 
For the third trading period 2013-2020 12,55394  tCO2/year can be allocated free of charge 
based on the Decision 2013/448/EU395 after the final  Decision of the Commission on 17 
January 2014 the earliest allocation could start at 18 January 2014. Furthermore based on 
Article 15 (4) of Act EU ETS and burden-sharing the NIMs is needed to be published which 
was made through the 1022/2014 Governmental Decision. 396   
From 2013 free allocation is not allowed for the electricity sector with the exception of the 
temporal derogation for the modernisation of electricity generation Article 10c of the 
Directive. On 30 November 2012 the Commission accepted Hungary's request for 
derogation, consequently, free allowances are allocated for some electricity generators, but 
they have to pay their market price which is determined by the state based on Article 3 (1) 
and (2) of 341/2013 Government Ordinance.397  
 
3.8.4 Enforcement tasks 
 
a. Monitoring and Reporting Obligations 
Article 3 of the EU ETS and burden-sharing Act defines the GHG permit as a legal act of the 
competent environmental Inspectorate (National Inspectorate for Environment, Nature and 
Water).398 Based on Article 10(1) of the Act each operator of an installation falling under the 
Act is required to monitor their emissions and send the annual verified reports to the 
competent authority (Inspectorate) by 31th March of the following year either per post or by 
electronically.399 Additionally, the Inspectorate is entitled to request further regular or 
occasional information from operators.400 For the monitoring plans, the annual emission 
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reports and the verification reports the Commission’s published template is used. No 
specifications have been added for Hungary. 
 
b. Verification  
During the first and second trading period verification could be carried out by independent 
verifiers (natural persons), verifier companies and EU verifiers.401 Several requirements 
applied for those verifiers – such as professional qualifications and experience- but there was 
not yet an independent accreditation process in place for verifiers that were active in 
Hungary.  
As of 1st January 2013 - required by Regulation 600/2012/EU - only accredited verifiers are 
entitled to carry out verification activities. In Hungary, the newly harmonized rules on 
verification were not adopted in a timely manner. Therefore, Hungary requested the 
European Commission derogation in order to have extra time to take the necessary 
measures. During an interim period (between 1 January 2013 and 30 April 2013), verifiers 
who had been previously registered by the competent authority were entitled to verify 
reports, but were not formally accredited yet. 
From 1st May 2013 accredited verifiers can verify reports; accreditation must now be 
requested from the National Accreditation Body (NAB) by using the form published on its 
website.402 After the approval of the accreditation the NAB publishes on its website the 
names of natural and legal persons who are entitled to verify. There are currently 4 verifiers 
active in Hungary.403 In addition, there are presently two companies based in the UK and one 
in Belgium registered at the NAB. 
 
c. Inspection 
The National Inspectorate has the competence to check the GHG emissions permit, and has 
to do so at least every five years.404  If necessary, following the findings of this process, it can 
modify or withdraw the permit. The operator has the obligation to report all changes which 
affect the operation of the installation, and which result in an increase or decrease of its 
capacity.405 In these cases the authority has to examine whether the permit needs to be 
modified. When the latter is the case, the National Inspectorate has to request the operator 
to apply for modification of the permit; non-significant changes do not require a change of the 
permit.406 The reports pursuant to Article 21 of the Directive for the period of 2008-2012 
noted that all of the verified reports were checked for completeness and most of the verified 
reports were checked fully in details. No non-satisfactory reports were provided.407  
However, although inspection and enforcement obligations are implemented in national 
legislation, practice is quite different. There is no ex-ante control and no assistance available 
for companies falling under the scope of the Directive. There exists ex-post control of the 
monitoring protocol, but only in an electronic way. No individual checks are made and no 
site-visits are undertaken. During the first phase, a priority system for regular checks was 
developed; however, this has however never been used.408 A review by the Unit for GHG 
Inventory brought to light some un-clarified figures. However, this was treated as a delicate 
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matter and no structural change has been made in the institutional structure or culture of the 
Inspectorate.  
For the year 2013 it was reported that two inspections of installations that were carried out 
through site visits by the Inspectorate.409 
 
d. Sanctions 
Different types of sanctions were implemented in order to enforce the EU ETS. For not 
(partly or fully) complying with the provisions on monitoring, reporting and verification 
obligations, or surrendering sufficient allowances the National Inspectorate can impose a 
punitive administrative fine on the operator. In addition, emissions trading can be suspended 
(by blocking the account) when the operator fails to surrender sufficient allowances or does 
not fulfil his reporting and verification obligations.410  
Since the third period, in case an infringement of Article 16(3) of the Directive is detected the 
National Inspectorate should also publish his name publicly (naming and shaming).411    
For the period 2008-2012 a few penalties were imposed, primarily for infringements of 
procedural rules (i.e., not sending the verified report by the deadline).412 In the 2010 two 
excess emission penalties pursuant to Article 16(3) of the Directive were imposed; in 2011 
and 2012 one penalty regarding 16(3) was imposed. In 2013 no fines or penalties were 
imposed.413 
 
3.8.5 Other compliance mechanisms: help desk for operators, collaboration across 
the EU  
 
There is no help desk available for operators, and communication with the Inspectorate has 
proven to be difficult. During the allocation process of the first phase an informal newsletter 
was send around, but this has ceased to exist. No customized guidance is provided for 
industry and no workshops are organized. Operators have send complaints to the Ministry of 
Agriculture over access to information, however this Ministry has no competence over EU 
ETS matters. It was noted in the annual report pursuant to Article 21 of the Directive that 
regular meetings with industry and/or verifiers were set up in 2013.  
Officially, Hungary is part of the EU Forum, but participation is limited (due to language 
barriers and capacity problems). 
 
It has proven challenging to gain full access to documentation and the Inspectorate in 
Hungary despite having a native research assistant in our team. This resulted in 
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3.9   Evaluation of the EU ETS with a focus on compliance: conclusions 
 
Under task 2.2, we did an ex-post evaluation of the legal implementation of the EU ETS at 
Member State level with a focus on compliance. Our central research question is: 
 
Has the effectiveness of the compliance mechanism of the EU ETS improved in the third 
phase (2013-2020)? What further improvements (if any) are necessary? 
 
To answer this central research question, we described the relevant EU law in each of the 
three phases, reviewed previous evaluations and relevant research projects, and evaluated 
the implementation of the EU ETS in selected Member States, both through existing sources 
and through interviews with key players in the compliance mechanism at Member State level. 
The Member States that we studied for the latter part of the project are Germany, 
Netherlands, Hungary, Greece Poland and the UK.   
 
The following conclusions can be drawn from the research project: 
 
1. Contrary to general belief, it is clear that monitoring and enforcement efforts of an 
emissions trading market mechanism must be much more intensive than with regular 
command and control type instruments. The EU had to adopt literally dozens of rules 
and regulations of various legal forms to secure a reliable compliance mechanism of 
the EU ETS. The entire compliance cycle of monitoring, reporting, verification and 
sanctioning is essential for the success of the ETS, but inherently very complex due 
to fluctuations of emissions and allowances. 
2. The regulatory framework for compliance has improved considerably since EU ETS 
commenced in 2005.  This is mostly attributed to tightened rules at EU level and, 
generally, centralization of the EU ETS. In particular, the harmonization of the rules 
for verifiers by Regulation 600/2012/EU marked a necessary improvement. 
3. Centralization and harmonization did not encompass the entire compliance cycle: 
national competent authorities have remained responsible for inspection and 
sanctioning, and are in charge of checking compliance of the MRV process. 
Therefore, achieving full compliance with the EU ETS still largely depends on the 
efforts of national competent authorities of EU Member States, Iceland, Norway and 
Liechtenstein. 
4. The various measures to combat VAT fraud, money-laundering and other criminal 
activities that were discovered in 2009 have improved the resilience of the EU ETS to 
respond to such criminal activities, even though it should be acknowledged that these 
past criminal activities did not target the allowances as such. Similar improvements 
stem from linking the EU ETS to the EU’s financial regulatory instruments (Market 
Abuse Directive and Anti-Money Laundering Directive), tightened rules on 
transactions, the range of available sanctions, centralizing auctioning and registration 
processes etc. the Registry. 
5. The two tier-system, whereby a first check is performed by independent verifiers hired 
by operators and a second check is conducted by competent authorities on the 
verified emissions report, works well. Verifiers detect most of the anomalies and take 
the necessary follow up actions. Emissions authorities have to be notified of these, so 
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that a lack of certified verifiers constitute a problem in some countries (e.g. Poland).  
As a result thereof some operators were unable to timely submit their annual report.  
6. Compliance with the EU ETS is very high (in 2012 there was only non-compliance 
between around 1 and 2%). Most infringements are caused by ‘genuine mistakes’ 
and lack of knowledge, not by deliberate actions to evade obligations. Since prices of 
allowances have been very low, the majority of allowances are surrendered and not 
traded. Hence, the EU ETS has not been tested to the full yet, and it remains to be 
seen whether compliance will be as high in a market under stress (with high prices 
due to limited availability of allowances).  
7. Since most infringements are caused by ignorance or misunderstandings, usually 
related to the complexity of the rules, it is important that competent authorities offer 
compliance assistance throughout the whole compliance cycle. Currently, there are 
profound differences among countries in this respect: some have an active helpdesk, 
regular mailings and meetings. Other countries have hardly any assistance. 
8. The use of ICT as a compliance assistance tool varies among Member States. The 
UK online ETSWAP system could serve as a basis for a more harmonized 
compliance in this respect. 
9. There are important differences in organization and style of inspection and 
enforcement among the Member States that were researched. Some countries 
depend largely on the verification process; others have developed their own 
inspection policy. In addition, there are notable variations in capacity and staff 
employed at the competent authorities. The number of staff employed in the national 
emissions authorities differs enormously.  
10. In some Member States (e.g. UK, the Netherlands, Hungary), all competences 
regarding the functioning of the ETS (issuing of permits, inspection and sanctioning) 
are bundled in one Agency. In other Member States competences are divided over 
different authorities. In general, it is considered wise to have separate authorities for 
the issuing of permits and for inspection and enforcement. This seems to be different 
for the EU ETS. Given the complexity of the EU ETS and the emphasis on 
compliance assistance, the emissions authority seems to be best placed overseeing 
the whole process, from the issuing of the GHG permit to possible sanctioning of non-
compliance. However, cooperation with regular environmental inspection authorities 
is to be   recommended (e.g. joint site inspections), since general environmental law 
inspectors will already have an established relationships with operators. Knowing the 
operator’s past (compliance) performance in other environmental areas can be useful 
when checking compliance with the EU ETS. 
11. Site visits are not yet part of the standard enforcement strategy of most Member 
States we studied. Only the UK and The Netherlands have a well-developed blueprint 
for conducting regular site visits on the basis of a risk assessment. There is a 
considerable risk that non-compliant behaviour will remain undetected when 
inspectors rely on data provided by the automated system (“paper work”).  
12. Although the automatic sanction of € 100 EUR per tonne CO2 equivalent emitted by 
an installation for which the operator did not surrender allowances is harmonized, 
there are major differences in the other administrative and criminal sanctions that can 
be imposed in case of evasion of rules, fraud, etc. These additional penalties in some 
Member States include huge fines (in the range of millions of euros) and substantial 
terms of imprisonment (up to ten years of jail time), and in others rather low fines (as 
low as € 1500, and no possibility to impose criminal charges). Further harmonization 
of these additional penalties could be considered, or, alternatively, the EU ETS 
Directive could be brought under Directive 2008/99/EC on the protection of the 
environment through criminal law.  
13. The UK has recently amended the ‘excess allowances’ sanction; if operators 
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to a €20 penalty; considering the recent ruling of the CJEU it is questionable whether 
Article 16(3) of the Directive sanctions this discretion. 
14. It is remarkable that the sanction of ‘naming and shaming’ is not actively applied in all 
Member States researched. The names of the installations that did not surrender 
sufficient allowances can be found in reports on the website of the emissions 
authority, but are far from easy to find. In the Netherlands and in Poland the names of 
the offending operators are published in its Journal of State. The sanction therefore 
seems to have lost a bit of its intended effect of reputation loss.  
15. The EU ETS Compliance Forum is regarded as highly valuable. Information and best 
practices are exchanged, frequently asked questions discussed and ideas are tested 
among peers. In addition, specific task forces on current issues are set up. However, 
given the voluntarily nature of the Forum, only very few Member States (particularly 
Germany, Netherlands, UK, France and to some extent Italy) are particularly active 
here. 
16. The information provided by the Member States in the reports pursuant to Article 21 
of the Directive do not provide a complete picture regarding actual compliance and 
enforcement of the EU ETS in the Member States. The new 2013 format for reporting 
has improved this somewhat (e.g. it is not sufficient anymore to state that checks 
were carried out on verified emission reports; it now needs to be specified what this 
checks entail). 
17. Overall, more efforts should be undertaken to harmonize the practice of the national 
competent authorities responsible for the enforcement of the EU ETS. This is not 
easily achieved; the case studies clearly show that compliance assistance is 
regarded as the most important element of the compliance cycle of the EU ETS. This 
compliance assistance is best offered at the national level in the national context. In 
addition, one could hold that the EU, with its extensive legislative framework, has 
exhausted its legislative powers in this field. Therefore, other forms of harmonization 
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4 Deviations 
The added value of this research is located in the qualitative assessment of enforcement 
strategies employed by national competent authorities. However, it has proven challenging to 
gain full access to documentation and the relevant competent authorities in some of our 
target countries. This was especially the case for Hungary and Greece, despite having two 
native research assistants on our team. This resulted in a short delay for Greece, and at 
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6 List of Abbreviations 
 
DECC- Department of Energy &Climate Change UK 
 
CDM – Clean Development Mechanism   
 
CITL - Community Independent Transaction Log  
 
CJEU – Court of Justice European Union 
 
DfT- Department for Transport (UK) 
 
DEHSt - Deutsche Emissionshandelsstelle (German Emissions Trading Authority).  
 
ECHR - European Convention on Human Rights 
 
EUTL - European Union Transaction Log  
 
EU ETS – European Union Emission Trading Scheme 
 
ESYD - The Hellenic Accreditation System (Greece) 
 
ETSWAP - Emissions Trading System Workflow Automation Program  
 
ETG -Emission Trading Group  
 
GEDE - Emissions Trading Office of the Ministry  
 
H.C.A.A  - Hellenic Civil Aviation Authority  
 
IPPC -integrated pollution prevention and control 
 
JI – Joint Implementation 
 
MRV - monitoring, reporting and the verification   
 
NAPs- National Allocation Plans  
 
NEa - Nederlandse Emissie Autoriteit  (Dutch Emission Authority) 
 
NIEA- Northern Ireland Environment Agency 
 
NIMs - National Implementation Measures  
 
VAT – Valued Added Tax 
 
Wm - Wet Milieubeheer (Dutch Environment Management Act) 
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UK ETS - UK Emissions Trading Scheme 
 
UNFCCC – United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change 
 
SEPA – Scottish Environment Protection Agency 
 
TEHG -  Gesetz über den Handel mit Berechtigungen zur Emission von Treibhausgasen 
 
YPEKA - Ministry of Environment, Energy and Climate Change  (Greece)  
 
 
